The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME XII New York, Saturday, September 15, 1917 Number 150

Contents

Editorial Notes 167
Leading Editorials
Aiding Our Enemies 169
Political Forces in Germany 172
The Excess Profits Tax 174
The I. W. W. Raids and Others 175
Ours Not to Reason Why 177
General Articles
The Future of the State ..... Herbert Croly 179
Coöperating with Washington ..... William Hard 183
Validity of the Child Labor Act .. Edward S. Corwin 186
On the Screen ..... Kenneth Macgowan 188
Tu Quoque ..... F. P. A. 190
Trivia ..... L. Pearsall Smith 190
Correspondence 191
Reviews of Books
A Different Galsworthy ..... F. H. 194
Authority and Freedom ..... H. J. L. 195
Excellent and Imperfect ..... R. H. L. 196
Recent Publications 198

THE counter-revolution, so frequently prophesied and so much to be feared, has begun in Russia. Its leader General Korniloff does not represent a merely military and anti-revolutionary faction. He is a patriotic soldier, who played a prominent part in the original revolution, who has found insufferable the recent demoralization of the Russian army and who believes its discipline depends upon the restoration of the death penalty for desertion. He has behind him apparently the whole group of national liberals which has accepted with reluctance the preponderance in the government of the socialists, and which without being really reactionary regards with dismay the radicalism and the internationalism of the Council of Workmen and Soldiers. The party has revolted in the hope of giving to Russia a government which although not anti-revolutionary would be sufficiently authoritative to reorganize the army and compel it to fight. They must be credited with a sincere desire to serve their country, but the result of their revolt is likely nevertheless to be calamitous. Unless either Kerensky or Korniloff wins an early victory and promptly suppresses all resistance, Russia is apparently doomed to pass through a civil struggle the effects of which will be to eliminate her army from the war, to make her political influence temporarily negligible and to imperil the safety of the revolution itself.

WHAT is most to be feared as a result of the counter-revolution is an ultimate reaction which goes far beyond the intention of General Korniloff and his supporters. The Kerensky government, whatever its shortcomings, did stand for an honest attempt to keep united behind the revolution all the groups whose coöperation had overthrown the Romanoffs, and to work out a program which satisfied in some measure the ideas both of the Russian internationalists and nationalists. It may be the attempt could not succeed, but the counter-revolutionists who have precipitated its failure may well be destroying the morale of the original March revolution without themselves having the power to substitute for it a new center of allegiance. No matter which side wins in the civil war, the victor will represent only one faction and may be driven to proscribe its opponents. The country will be plunged into a still deeper abyss of economic disorganization, from which it cannot emerge as long as the great war lasts. The sufferings brought on the people by the revolution will displace in their minds the sufferings and the humiliations of the old régime. Finally, the thoroughgoing reactionaries will strive to restore a large part of that régime under the name of a constitutional monarchy. The result of any such revival of Russian militarist nationalism would be an increase in the prestige of the military caste in Germany, and consequently of the difficulties of organizing an enduring peace. The Kerensky government was doubtless costing a good deal but it was worth saving. It was fighting for the principles which the Allies have proclaimed as their own more successfully than the best disciplined Russian army could do.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SO long as Kerensky stood alone as a bulwark of Russian nationalism against the disintegrating and pacifist influences of the Maximalists, even the most irretrievably bourbon of foreign commentators accepted his socialistic policies as good at least for Russia. But now that Korniloff has risen to dispute Kerensky's authority, the bourbons are relieved of the hard necessity of underwriting socialism anywhere. Korniloff is their man of the hour. He represents the " conservative men of intelligence, of reason, of firmness, and of patriotism that regard the welfare of the whole, not of the part," as one inspired leader writer puts it. He stands for discipline and above all for the death penalty. Perhaps Korniloff can save Russia for bourbonism, if not for the Allies. But perhaps not. The " conservative men of intelligence, of reason, of firmness " represent a remarkably small faction of the Russian population. Among the many stupidities of the old régime, one of the most serious, from a conservative point of view, was its failure to encourage the development of a substantial middle class. Russia is essentially a land of peasants and workmen who lived miserably in peace and have suffered beyond endurance in the war. The man who is to redeem Russia must be a man with the ability to command the confidence and to inspire the hopes of this unhappy proletariat. Will Korniloff and the death penalty meet the case?

WHAT the German censor permits the Germans to know about the Soukhomlinoff trial convinces them that the Russian government planned this war and prepared for it as systematically as any government honeycombed with graft and treason could prepare. What the Allied censorship permits us to know gives us no clue whatever to this German delusion. Some evidence must certainly have been adduced bearing upon the question of responsibility for the war, since the Allied authorities who have access to the whole record are accusing the German government of suppressing testimony that would tend to exculpate Russia from the blame for bringing on the war. No doubt the Germans are suppressing pertinent facts. The German censorship, like that of our Allies, permits the people to have such information as, in the judgment of the censors, is good for them. The result is that a meeting of minds of the peoples, on any subject having even a remote relation to the war, becomes impossible. For us to form opinions on the basis of the same facts as the Germans is regarded by the censors as a species of fraternizing in the trenches. And this view would be the correct one to take if the war were to last forever.

THE fall of the Ribot ministry seems mainly due to one of those obscure internal intrigues which have been the curse of the French republic from its origin. The prestige of the government had already been seriously injured by the failure of General Nivelle's offensive last spring; and its general inertia in the face of a rapidly changing situation led to a refusal of support from the socialists in the chamber. M. Ribot seems to have been unable to appreciate either the significance of the Russian Revolution or the importance of the American entry into the war. His relations with his own cabinet have not been distinguished by the personal ascendancy a French premier requires if he is to remain premier. What exactly has been the connection of Malvy with the dangerous speculations of Caillaux, how far he really did shield the German intrigues of the Bonnet Rouge no one not at the heart of French politics can tell. The resignation of Malvy merely forced an issue and did not decide it. The real crux came from the gap between the peace terms for which Albert Thomas stands, and the inability of Ribot not merely to formulate peace terms, but also to direct the war upon the basis of their formulation. The socialists seem willing to support a ministry in which the present war minister, Painlevé, and Albert Thomas will be the dominating figures. The radical associations of M. Painlevé will make him a far more acceptable premier to the Left than M. Ribot could ever have been, and the great record he has left behind him at the War Office gives ground for the hope that French policy will now have the firmness and direction it has in the last months so sadly needed.

IT seems clear that, on the whole, the tendency of British opinion has been towards a frank and full acceptance of the American note. Lord Robert Cecil's original endorsement has been officially recognized by the government; and though Sir Edward Carson still talks of " crushing German militarism " in the style of 1914, it is not evident that he has spoken for any representative body of thoughtful men. The journals which have lent him their support either stand, like the Morning Post, for a high-and-dry Toryism which, in its watchwords and its results, approximates in ideas to the theories of Prussian autocracy, or, like the Daily Express, represents the primitive desire for unadulterated revenge. This attitude, indeed, has the sanction of Miss Christabel Pankhurst and her mother who, through their organ, the Britannia, seem anxious to turn England into a kind of perfected Prussia. But Britannia is now entirely unimportant. The major portion of the suffrage party has officially withdrawn its support

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from the Pankhursts, and their effort is to-day simply an unqualified opportunism which aims at their own survival. Sober English opinion, as the overwhelming vote of the Trade Union Congress in favor of free trade makes clear, is solidly behind Mr. Wilson's views. Indeed, as the result of the war becomes more certainly hopeful, the dogged hate which was characteristic of the British temper in gloom, seems to change rapidly into a confident eagerness in the kind of coöperation to which the President has pledged American resources.

IN default of a real issue, Tammany has seized upon the New York school situation, and with it in hand is grooming its candidate, Judge Hylan, for the mayoralty campaign. The judge's attacks upon the Gary plan and the Rockefeller Foundation are of a piece with the irresponsible agitation that has been carried on during the last year through parents' associations and mushroom popular organizations throughout the city. The animus in this "anti-Gary" campaign is now revealed as no disinterested concern for conserving education, but as a careful cultivation of popular prejudice against the one point where the Mitchell administration could be made to seem vulnerable. Tammany now hopes politically to reap its reward from the excitement about that discrimination against the schools with which the Mitchell administration has been so unfairly charged because of its backing of the Gary plan. It would be a sad slur on the intelligence of the city if this palpably artificial agitation were allowed to spread beyond those districts where popular prejudice has been manufactured. Judge Hylan should be taught by the newspapers and by the school people themselves that the school issue is a boomerang, and that if there is no more convincing issue upon which to attack the administration, there would better be no attack at all.

NO real reason exists for regretting the extension of the Gary plan in New York. Those schools where reorganization has gone farthest have already solved the problem of congestion and extended the opportunities for a rounded training. Twelve and a half million dollars have been appropriated by the administration for this improvement of the elementary schools, and of that sum six millions are for new buildings. If only a small portion of this money has been spent, the blame lies with the inefficient routine of the educational machine, not with the Mayor. The new small Board of Education to be appointed in January ought to be able to abolish most of that dilatoriness and intrigue which has impeded school reforms for so long in New York. It is extremely important that that Board should be progressive, and continue the school policies of the present administration. The school situation in New York is the most difficult in the world. Political conflict, an archaic system, and rapid growth of population conspire to defeat the best efforts of educational administrators. The way to orderly progress, however, does not lie in turning out of office a Mayor under whom such substantial progress has already been made.

IF conservation of the workers is sound policy to meet the demands of peace, then it is an imperative duty in facing the acute strain of war. And the wellbeing of the large army of men engaged in loading and unloading vessels is becoming increasingly a matter of national concern. In calling upon Congress to enact a law immediately restoring the protection of workmen's compensation to these "indispensable workmen who are to our Allies and our country so peculiarly the first line of defense," the American Association for Labor Legislation points out an urgent need for corrective legislation. Longshoremen and their families are now made to suffer unjustly the loss of compensation benefits they have been accustomed to depend upon, in common with other workers. The divided opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the Jensen case recently deprived such workmen of the protection of workmen's compensation laws by ascribing their cases, when injured in the course of duty, to maritime liability jurisdiction. Many states are affected by this decision. In New York alone some five thousand "dock workers" are seriously injured in the course of their employment every year. To leave them at the mercy of expensive, slow-moving and uncertain court trials for just indemnities is repugnant to the national policy of accident compensation.

Aiding Our Enemies

NOW that the first explosion of surprise and approval over the President's reply to the Pope has subsided, it will be useful to consider some of its less obvious meanings and consequences. Unlike the usual utterances of the chief of a great democracy during war, it was addressed primarily not to his fellow-countrymen, but to the people of an enemy country, and not less unusual was the kind of communication which he has tried to establish with these official adversaries. He neither threatened them, nor denounced them, nor declared his undying intention of beating them. On the contrary, he showed the utmost confidence in their good intentions. He offered them the assist-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ance of this country in obtaining a peace of reconciliation in case they would place safeguards upon the irresponsible action of their own government analogous to those which existed in other modern states. This attempt to appeal from the German government to the German people was one of the first examples in history of a purely democratic diplomacy. It assumed an underlying community of purpose and good faith among the peoples of all countries, which was not to be broken even by war, and in the very midst of war he sought to galvanize these common possessions into effective life. He may or may not succeed in his effort to use a diplomacy of hope and good faith without abandoning the threat of ultimate coercion, but what we Americans need to realize is the improbability of success, unless his generous enterprise is loyally supported by his own fellow-countrymen. They as democrats have a part to play in this unconventional and subversive diplomacy. For unless the German people can detect in Mr. Wilson's appeal the voice of one democracy speaking words of conciliation and counsel to another, it will be difficult for them to accept his plea at its full face value.

Hitherto President Wilson has not received the needed support. Because his enterprise is unprecedented and almost revolutionary, because it unites the constructive strategy of international good faith among democracies with the sinister alternative of war to the bitter end, his countrymen have in part failed to understand his purpose and are not acting so as to assure its complete success. They are accustomed to consider the methods of war and peace as mutually exclusive rather than as supplementary. In too many instances they have not discerned how necessary it may be to use war as a barrier to the success of military aggression yet how necessary it may also be to fall back on a policy of conciliation in order to gather from the bloody battlefields a harvest of enduring peace. Thus President Wilson's success is compromised by the existence within the nation of two factions, both of which are unwittingly doing something to aid the enemy. There is the faction of the absolutist pacifists who refuse to believe that war can be made to serve the cause of peace, and there is the faction of the head-long militarists who are striving to poison a war, expressly intended to serve the cause of peace, with vindictive passions and irreconcilable moral judgments. Both of these factions are making it more difficult for their national leader to accomplish its official policy with the utmost celerity and at the smallest cost.

Hitherto the dogmatic pacifists have been watching the course of the war with a complacent sense of their own ultimate vindication. A war which would promote liberalism and safeguard democracy was, they declared, proved by the conduct of the present war to be an impossibility. Liberalism and democracy were only fine words used by conscious or unconscious tools of capitalism to delude the people. The net benefits to be obtained by the participation of this country in the war would be wholly insufficient to justify their appalling cost, and any claim to that effect was one of those amiably repulsive hypocrisies, under which middle class intellectuals cloak their surrender to militarism. War was, they argued, absolutely and inexorably illiberal. It was as illiberal in the United States under the leadership of President Wilson as it was in Germany with the Kaiser as chief. Was not the American government straining its legal powers to suppress that freedom of discussion which in sober moments is admitted to constitute the ultimate safeguard of democracy and the essential condition of any real vitality of public opinion? Is not public opinion itself blindly and stupidly intolerant, the victim of cheap war cries and overwrought credulity? Is not the country being surrendered morally and intellectually as well as physically to the reign of force? Either Mr. Wilson did not mean what he said when he asked his country to exemplify in its own behavior the democratic principles for which it is fighting, or he is impotent to give effect to his own meaning. However much he started as a liberal, he was bound to end as a war-lord.

Although much has been done by the jingo press and by over-zealous officials to justify the discomposure of the pacifists, the event is proving their thesis to be essentially wrong. President Wilson, in spite of the temporary aberration of the Flag-day speech, is managing to make war, barbarous and dangerous as it is, subordinate to the purpose of democracy. In two essential respects participation in the present war by this country has been of indispensable and decisive service to the cause of democracy. By coming in, America both prevented the unmitigated calamity of a partial or a decisive German victory, and it has infused a democratic leaven into the strategy of Germany's enemies. The German people are no longer confined to the alternative of a humiliating defeat, followed by a punitive treaty of peace, or an ultimate victory obtained regardless of cost to the fabric of social order. They are offered a way out which substitutes a victory of the principles of the Allies for a victory of their armies and which can be adopted by German liberals because they themselves have always stood for similar principles. If America had not assumed the risk of war or if it now betrays any indication of abandoning its uncompromising hostility to the designs of the German

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government, that government would have been or will be to a greater or smaller extent reënforced by the prestige of success. The price of American abstention or of American withdrawal or weakening would be the collapse of democracy in France, Great Britain and Germany under the attacks of its foreign and domestic enemies. But because America went in and its leader supplemented the policy of an unflinching resistance to German militarism with that of diplomatic encouragement to German liberalism, democracy in all the belligerent countries has a chance of emerging from the war, not indeed unimpaired and unscarred, but essentially victorious both over its own mischances and the machinations of its enemies. It is this chance which American pacifist opponents of the war policy of the administration are seeking to extinguish. In acquiescing in German victory they are encouraging the enemies of democracy all over the world.

But they are not the only Americans who are giving aid and comfort both to the enemies of their own country and to the enemies of democracy. Not less unpatriotic and equally baleful in its effects is the behavior of those of our fellow-countrymen who instead of seeking to discipline the weapon of war to the service of democracy are doing their best to poison the souls of their countrymen with sheer Jacobin barbarism. Until the President broke his long silence we were drifting into a situation whch permitted vacant and bumptious minds like that of Mr. Cleveland Moffett, to set themselves up as the arbiters of loyalty. The man who could most easily become red in the face was erected into the model which others were expected to imitate. If you were disposed to be a little less hectic, a little more reasonable, a trifle discriminating, you were suspected of sedition. It rendered you liable to be haled before an unofficial Vigilance Committee of Public Safety and be morally lynched or guillotined in order that the republic might be purified. Winning the war, so it seemed, depended on losing our reason.

The purpose of the President's reply to the Pope may well be frustrated unless something is done to revise these simple notions of how a patriot should think and feel and talk. The Americans who repudiate and abhor all moderation and all toleration, and who confuse complete loyalty with complete jingoism, are not only perverting the spirit of democracy at home for the ostensible purpose of safeguarding its interests in the world, but they are thwarting the success of the declared and accepted policy of their own nation. They are aiding the German government in its militarist ambitions by helping it sustain the morale and secure the thick-and-thin allegiance of the German people. They have been making it extremely difficult for German liberals to convince their fellow-countrymen that the President really means what he says. Thus they are actually strengthening the resistance which the American army and navy will have to overcome. Unless they can be persuaded to cease their recriminations and moderate their truculence, billions of superfluous dollars will have to be spent before the war is brought to a successful conclusion and many thousands of young Americans will be unnecessarily killed. All that the German general staff really needs in the way of war propaganda is a liberal supply of quotations from such spokesmen of democracy as the New York Times and Sun or the Morning Post of London.

There is no exaggeration in the foregoing indictment. The cables from Copenhagen and Amsterdam have illustrated repeatedly the obstacles which American jingoism is placing in the path of American democratic diplomacy. German liberal journals have been obliged to warn their readers against the way in which American newspapers have perverted the meaning of the President's reply, and the great difficulty which the Catholic Centrists have had of converting the President's offer into a help rather than into a hindrance to their work on behalf of reform in Germany has been its popular interpretation in America as a mere shriek of defiance. This kind of talk or writing is clearly maleficent. The President has officially adopted the contention that the war can be won for liberalism if and only if military force can be redeemed by a clarifying and reassuring diplomacy. Henceforth any American citizen or newspaper who preaches an irreconcilable program, who indulges in angry recriminations against the whole German nation and who insists upon military victory as the only instrument of political and moral victory is injuring the successful prosecution of the war by his own government. The most flagrant pacifist who wishes to stop the fighting before the end is achieved is not giving any more aid and comfort to the enemy than the jingo whose talk and whose program tend to cement the union between the German people and the German government. True patriotism, even in the midst of war, has ceased to mean proscription, the extreme of emotional intemperance, a harsh Jacobinism of mind, and the systematic attempt either actually or morally to lynch everyone whom the "patriot" prefers to suspect or to dislike. It has come rather to mean, as it did in the case of Abraham Lincoln, scrupulous fairness of attitude towards enemies within and without the gates, ultimate stability of national purpose, and an indefatigable and open-minded attempt to fulfil it in the least costly way by uniting the immediate resistance of war with a political policy of ultimate conciliation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Forces in Germany

THE Prussian junker is represented in the Reichstag by the Conservatives and the Agrarians. His sway over these two parties, however, is not complete; he shares it with several other reactionary interests, such as the big industries and also a fraction of the middle class in districts with a majority of agricultural electors. The general policy of the Conservative party has been one of unconditional support of the government. The industrial element has supported all increases in the army and the navy and the junker element in return has supported all laws tending to restrict the power of labor. The Conservative landed junker has generously permitted the big industrialists to have their fling at territorial expansion as expressed in the colonial and Pan-German policy of the government. The Agrarian party, on the other hand, has sometimes vigorously opposed the policies of the government. Its political rôle is the defense of the interests of the agricultural population, especially those of the landowner, and it is only remotely concerned with German interests abroad, since such interests have no direct bearing on the wellbeing of German agriculture.

The junker distrusts, as a rule, the spirit which has carried Germany across the seas. He is a soldier by habit, but he questions the wisdom of policies of imperialistic adventure. As a farmer he prefers to be let alone so long as he can convince a generally appreciative government of the necessity of holding up the prices of agricultural products. The junkers worked more actively than any other class toward the establishment of the present German policy of high protection. They also succeeded in exacting from the nation many special bounties and concessions. How they came to support Pan-Germanism, a policy opposed to their natural interests and inclinations, is a question that cannot be answered dogmatically. It has been said that the influence of the Kaiser brought the junkers over to Pan-Germanism. But a more plausible explanation is the pressure applied to the junkers by the big industrialists, with whom the junkers must work in harmony if they are to maintain their interests against the growing forces of liberalism and labor.

Pan-Germanism as a practical policy rests primarily upon the support of a small group of captains of industry, who have regularly employed the movement to advance their own material interests. This group, with the remaining elements of the Conservative-Agrarian alliance in tow, were chiefly responsible for Germany's action in forcing the war in 1914. They must also bear the responsibility for the failure of the German peace plan of the winter of 1916. When the history of this period of the war is authentically written, it will almost certainly show that Bethmann-Hollweg was willing to make a serious bid for peace. That a definite peace proposal was on the way from Germany was well known in the neutral capitals. But Bethmann-Hollweg's peace plans were upset. The immediate cause of his failure was his underestimation of the strength of the Conservative-Agrarian coalition. Before Bethmann-Hollweg could carry into execution his project of a peace offer that could be seriously considered by the Allies, representatives of the junker-industrialist group had gained the ear of the Kaiser. The iron barons were not willing to let go the rich iron and coal mines of Belgium and Northern France. Possessing those resources, they argued cogently, Germany could safely defy any coalition, political or economic, of the other powers. In their annexationist demands the iron barons were backed by the military and naval authorities, who still labored under the delusion that the submarine would prove an effective weapon.

The work of the chancellor, however, was not lost. Although he finally fell a victim to the forces he had unloosed, the discusssion of peace continued unremittingly. But Bethmann-Hollweg's chief service to Germany was the exposure of the power of the junker-industrial combination. Thinking men could no longer overlook the sinister possibilities of this combination, and the forces of revolt were set in motion in the Reichstag.

As was to be expected, the revolt was inaugurated on the extreme left among the advanced Socialists. Gradually the revolt spread until it has now reached the National Liberals. The position of the National Liberals in the party system of the German Reichstag is peculiar. Originally the party consisted largely of upper middle class elements with conservative leanings. It was practically called into being by Bismarck, who needed it to combat the power of the Conservatives and the still less amenable forces of the Catholic Center. Both the Conservatives and the Liberals have made frequent deals with the National Liberals. In some cases the National Liberals have joined with the Conservatives to defeat Liberal candidates, and in other cases they have joined with the Liberals to defeat Conservative candidates. However successful the National Liberals may have been in securing immediate political results, their policy did not make for unity of purpose within the party. After Bismarck the party counted for little. Bethmann-Hollweg gave some attention to it as a possibly useful instrument, and it appears that Michaelis has also turned to it, only to find it in a state of complete disruption in consequence of opposing tendencies in the matter of the peace question.

The Center is perhaps organized the strongest of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all the German parties, resting as it does upon a religious basis. The whole force of the Catholic church of Germany is brought to bear in its support. The Center, backed by the devoted Catholics of Germany, defied Bismarck successfully during the so-called Kultur-war, as it now defies Michaelis. Notwithstanding its position as a religious party, it has always allied itself with the parties of progress. It now finds itself working with the Liberal People's party, the Progressive Liberals and other parties which represent the various shades of liberal thought among the German middle class.

The present Reichstag is composed of 45 Conservatives and Agrarians, 44 National Liberals, 91 Centrists, 46 Liberals and 100 representatives of the Social Democracy and the Labor party. There are further 59 members belonging to minor parties of diverse political creeds and national sentiments. The votes obtained by each of the leading groups in the last election were:—1,126,270 for the Conservatives and Agrarians, 1,662,670 for the National Liberals, 1,996,845 for the Center, 1,497,041 for the Liberal parties and 4,250,399 for the Social Democrats.

If we hold in mind the party composition of the Reichstag we shall understand better the internal political situation of Germany. From the support that the Reichstag has given to its peace resolution and the bold position it has taken against the new chancellor, it is quite clear that the government will not make much headway with any policy not calculated to lead to an early peace. Not even the German government can long remain in opposition to the representatives of the people. The government will either have to give way or dissolve the Reichstag and try its luck at a new election. It is now rumored that the government will take the latter step.

At a time when the issues at stake involve the prerogative of the Crown as to war and peace, an election might prove very dangerous to the monarchic idea in Germany. But if the government wants to carry on the war still longer it needs the undivided support of the nation, and in this case of the Reichstag. The government can not now make peace with annexations, and the Reichstag does not consider the prospect of such a peace worth the costs that it would entail, even if it were attainable in the end.

Thus the policy of the government is balked by the present Reichstag, and it has no guaranty that an appeal to the country would strengthen its position. Such an appeal, moreover, would represent a tacit admission that it is not the Crown, but the German nation, that makes the final decision as to peace or war. The course of events runs against the prerogative. Having failed in its attempt to bring the war to a speedy and successful end the Crown has been forced more and more to rely on the goodwill of the people. In consequence the independent position of the Crown has become gradually weaker until a pass has been reached where the Reichstag is visibly taking control.

It is hardly possible that this situation would be changed materially by a dissolution of the Reichstag at least so long as the Center keeps true to its determination to have peace and parliamentary control. Whatever the outcome of the election, Socialists would be returned from all the industrial centers, and the Center would hold practically all its present strength. Almost certainly a sufficiently large number of Liberals would be returned to assure, in conjunction with the Socialists and the Center, the continuance of the policy of the present Reichstag. All that the government could reasonably expect to gain would be a brief respite while the elections were being held and the new Reichstag assembling.

The policy of territorial expansion is now supported only by the industrial section of the Conservatives and by such minor political groups as the Pan-Germans. Their press, much quoted in this country, is really of very little importance in Germany. The Tägliche Rundschau, the Post, and the Kreuzzeitung are journals having in the aggregate 50,000 readers, as compared with the 300,000 readers of the Morgenpost, the 200,000 of the Berliner Tageblatt, both leading journals of the Liberal party, and the big circulation of the socialistic Vorwärts. The Morgenpost, the Tageblatt and Vorwärts, as well as the Frankfurter Zeitung and other important Liberal papers, have taken a very decided stand as to the urgency of parliamentary reform. These are the journals that really represent the temper of the German nation.

The war party in Germany, as we have seen, depends mainly upon the support of the Conservative-Agrarian combination, a minority element in the Reichstag and still more decidedly a minority element in the general electorate. The strength of the combination is derived largely from the advantageous social position and wealth of the junkers and industrialists who constitute its leadership. But the party has not been able to command the allegiance of all the big industries of Germany. Neither the great chemical industries nor the electrical industries have given undivided allegiance to the Conservative group. The chemical and electrical industries are dependent upon foreign markets, and, since their products are not staples that can be forced down the consumer's throat, they naturally incline toward a liberal and conciliatory commercial policy. There are numerous minor industries in similar case. All these industries have consistently advocated moderate protection and the cultivation of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foreign markets. Their political representatives, like the population at large, were swept off their feet by the great wave of patriotism that followed the declaration of war and down to the present have loyally supported the government's war policy. But the entrance of America into the war has opened their eyes to the commercial consequences of that policy and they are now joining with those who are urging peace.

To these groups working for peace it appears that we must now add the intellectuals. The German intellectuals were largely responsible for the currents of thought which made war inevitable three years ago. It was this class that gave the most hearty endorsement to the world policy inaugurated by the government and by speeches and pamphlets succeeded in popularizing it throughout Germany. The Pan-German movement is a product of the intellectuals. But Pan-Germanism had passed its zenith even before the outbreak of the war. It was losing its hold upon the manufacturing and trading middle class. For many years an opposing intellectual movement had been growing up under the shelter of the Social Democracy. High spirited men of all classes were being won over to socialism, which had taken firm root in the universities. As the Pan-German intellectual movement recedes, socialistic intellectualism gains headway. It is bound to play an important part in the movement toward peace and the liberation of Germany.

The Excess Profits Tax

WHAT is the most reasonable rate of taxation to levy in time of war? Quite plainly, the rate that promises to contribute most toward winning the war. It must be a productive tax. But this is not the only test of its reasonableness. A more important test is its effect on production. For a deficit in tax revenue may be made up, temporarily, through loans. A deficit in production cannot be made up at all. A still more important test is its effect upon public sentiment. A tax may be so high or so low as to cause general discontent, prejudicial to the national morale. The winning of wars depends upon armies, first of all; upon the national production, second, but still more important; and upon the national morale, most important of all. For an unshakable national morale will somehow generate armies and the munitions and supplies needed to make them effective. A nation shot through with discontent and cross purposes, though possessed of inexhaustible man power and superb courage, will fight after the fashion of Russia in the latter months.

Judged by these three tests, is the excess profits tax embodied in the pending revenue bill the most reasonable tax? It is a productive tax. It will yield a billion and a quarter, if official estimates of the aggregate of such profits are near the mark. It could have been more productive. Another billion and a quarter could have been drawn from this source without exhausting it. We shall come out of the war burdened with a billion and a quarter of debt beyond what we would have found upon our shoulders if we had taxed profits so drastically as we might have done. But on this point we are offered copious reassurance by the defenders of moderate rates. That billion and a quarter will not be lost to the nation. It will be found among the private possessions of the excess profiteers, chiefly in the form of productive capital. This reassurance we may accept for what it is worth.

How will production be affected by these modest taxation rates? We cannot doubt that production will be stimulated in the industries in which profits remain huge after the tax has been deducted. The Steel Corporation, with nearly $200,000,000 to divide, if it chooses, after paying its tax, may be expected to produce as much as it possibly can. The Corporation's output, we may be quite sure, will be limited only by the capacity of its mills, the supply of suitable labor, the supply of material or some other element not capable of expanding at the Steel Corporation's command. Suppose that the excess profit had been cut by the tax to $100,000,000 or even $50,000,000, would the Corporation's output be materially reduced? Not immediately, at any rate. Fifty millions in addition to the comfortable profits of peace times are worth striving for.

The premium on production represented by large profits may be excessive in the case of such fortunate concerns as the Steel Corporation. It may have beneficial ulterior effects in the way of providing for additions to plant that may be needed before the war is over. But it is not to be forgotten that excess profits are one aspect of a problem of which excess prices are another aspect. If there were no inflated prices there would be no excess profits. If there were no excess profits received by private individuals, there would be nothing to be said of excess prices.

It is plain that so long as excess profit goes to private individuals, the government must endeavor to keep prices from soaring too high. We are already regulating the prices of some commodities, and it is inevitable that the range of regulated prices will be greatly extended if the war drags on. Now, regulation cannot make different prices for the products of establishments working under varying conditions of cost. It cannot fix one price for billets produced by the Steel Corporation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and another price for billets of the same grade produced by a smaller and less efficient independent concern. The price it fixes may be one that offers sufficient inducement to the Steel Corporation to produce its maximum, while it is very discouraging to the independent steel company. We hear much murmuring from the coal industry that the prices actually established by the President's order are too low to permit the weaker operators to develop their maximum production.

Regulation that is sufficiently drastic to protect the public from prices yielding excessive profits to the stronger concerns thus discourages the weaker firms and keeps aggregate production from attaining its maximum. Less coal will be raised at two dollars a ton than at three dollars, and we need all the coal we can get. Would it not have been better, then, to have fixed the price at three dollars? No: this would have meant several hundred millions of dollars transferred from the pockets of the consumer to those of the coal mine owners and operators. Better some deficit in production than to submit to such an enormous tax for private enrichment.

But if practically all of the excess profit generated by the three-dollar price were covered into the public treasury, this objection to the higher price would fall away. We could have a price that would induce maximum output, instead of one inducing less. In general terms, absence of an excess profits tax drastic enough to absorb surpluses not needed to stimulate production forces upon us a price policy too drastic to permit maximum production. In its repercussion upon price regulation, then, the moderation of the rate of excess profits taxation acts unfavorably upon production. It is not the most reasonable rate.

It remains to inquire whether the rates of the tax are such as to create general harmony and contentment or the reverse. It goes without saying that there is profound contentment among those whose excess profits are so much more liberally treated than was to be anticipated in the face of the colossal expenditures of the war. But the excess profiteers represent a very small minority. For most businesses the prosperity of the war is illusory. Prices have risen, but costs have risen in many cases more than proportionately. And in a much wider range of cases, while prices do now afford a comfortable margin above costs, it is well understood that the deflation that will follow the conclusion of peace will strike prices first and costs at an interval later. Multitudes of business men are snatching a meagre harvest under the shadow of the coming storm. Are they content with a taxation policy that leaves huge sums of profits in the hands of a favored few?

Perhaps they are. Business men have a strong esprit de corps. Not even the most fortunate millionaire, gasping under the flood of war profits, will plead so eloquently the sacredness of private profit, as many a poor devil of a clothing contractor, likely to be wiped out any day by a leap in the price of cloth. But the problem of morale relates to the millions who are not business men, the farmers who see their two-dollar wheat eaten up by the price of fertilizers and machinery and labor, the workers who encounter a widening gulf between the pay envelope and the market basket. How many of them now have on their tongues' ends that epitome of proletarian war philosophy, "A rich man's quarrel and a poor man's fight?"

This is not a rich man's war, but a war of the democracy. This would be clearer, however, to the democrat himself if he could look about him and see everywhere only men of all classes serving and sacrificing themselves and their possessions according to the best measure of their ability. But when he sees some men, as good men and as sincere no doubt as any others, hugely profiting, the faith that is in him receives a rude shock. The moral effect of unduly moderate taxation of excess profits is bad, and it is of no use to try to gloss the fact.

Our national legislature has worked out a schedule of excess profits taxation that is not the most prolific of revenue, not the best adapted to stimulate production, not the best calculated to consolidate the national morale, and therefore not the most reasonable. It is a curious fact that this inadequate tax is sponsored by the majority who are enthusiastically in favor of the war, while the minority, lukewarm or opposed to the war, fought desperately for a tax much better suited to the national need. But the minority wanted the impossible, it has been said. They wanted to take practically the whole of excess profits. No, few of them desired to take more than Great Britain takes, four-fifths of it. Well, if four-fifths, why not the whole? Only because in fiscal matters, it never pays to cut too close to the quick.

The I. W. W. Raids and Others

WITH a swift decisiveness in sharp contrast to the vacillating attitude of other governmental departments toward labor, the Department of Justice has swooped down upon the headquarters of the I. W. W. in all parts of the country, seized their records and imprisoned many of their leaders. In advance of such evidence as may be developed at the trials, the press is filled with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hints of "gigantic conspiracies to cripple the government in carrying on the war" and with "indications" pointing to German money as the "source of financial support." If such a conspiracy is established, the country will have reason to be grateful to the Department of Justice for its trenchant vigor in striking down a national peril.

But the country will make a serious mistake if it leaps to the conclusion that the activities of the I. W. W. comprehend all the perils that threaten the effective industrial prosecution of the war. The press has shown an increasing disposition to stamp all manifestations of labor unrest with the outlawed brand of the I. W. W. and to gloss over both the unpatriotic conduct of certain employers and the legitimate grievances of wage earners who have not the remotest connection with the advocates of sabotage.

A few weeks ago we were led to believe that Bisbee, Arizona, was a hotbed of the I. W. W. conspiracy. There were widespread manifestations of sympathy for the men in Bisbee who took the law into their own hands and under guise of patriotism—an expressed determination to protect the country against interference with the output of essential metals—corralled some twelve hundred citizens and dropped them without food or water into the desert. It soon transpired that a considerable percentage of the departed men were holders of liberty bonds, contributors to the Red Cross and in other respects active supporters of the government. By order of a local mining corporation, the telegraph office had been seized and even the Associated Press dispatches had been censored for the deliberate purpose of concealing or distorting the facts. The deportees were rescued by the United States army, but what action the Department of Justice has taken or intends to take to bring the respectable lawbreakers to justice is not yet a matter of common knowledge. About the same time there was a strike of street car operatives in a western city. The strikers were notified that unless they returned to work they would be held for treason. The employers called for troops on the ground that the strike was the work of irresponsible agitators with a definite I. W. W. taint. Within a few days these allegations were completely disproved in the course of negotiations that ended the strike on terms satisfactory to the operatives. For months the shipbuilding industry in the East was crippled by the refusal of the organized employers to deal with representatives of the organized men, and again hints crept into the newspapers that German money was crossing the palms of the trade union leaders. Two weeks ago the government in deciding to put an end to an intolerable situation created a commission of three to adjust labor controversies in the ship yards and decreed not only that one member of the commission should be appointed by the president of the national organization with which the union of the strikers was affiliated, but also that the examiner of employment conditions for the workers should be chosen by "such international labor organizations as have members engaged in production or construction of ships."

The mischievous tendency to assume that all strikes have a sinister origin is fostered rather than checked by the action of the government in creating boards for the democratic control of labor conditions in isolated cases while avoiding the announcement of any clearly defined comprehensive policy with respect to labor in all industries under contract with the government or its agents. The appointment of Mr. Gompers to the chairmanship of the labor committee of the national advisory commission and the recognition of the propriety of consulting him regarding the personnel of such labor adjustment commissions as have been formed has conveyed the impression that the interests of all workers in all establishments under contract for the government are being adequately cared for. Strikes are therefore made to appear as expressions of disloyalty not only to the nation but also to the authorized spokesman of labor itself. But the membership of the American Federation of Labor includes a minority of the wage workers of the country, and the jurisdiction of the labor adjustment boards, which the government has so far created, covers an insignificant fraction of this membership. Only seven of these boards are in existence, and with the exception of the clothing and shipbuilding industries, they were created to deal with temporary situations such as those arising in connection with the building of the cantonments and aviation fields. Of the thousands of contracts let in behalf of the government, a negligible number include specific provision for the democratic adjustment of labor controversies by the joint action of representatives of the employers and the men. The government has resorted to the principle of collective bargaining as a desperate remedy in isolated cases only; until by their collective action the men force the government to act the government has no labor policy.

The evils of this vacillating opportunism are piling up daily; they are unquestionably jointly responsible with the activities of the anti-war forces for the aggravation of industrial unrest. The government recently let a large contract for tractors and "tanks." No provision was made in the contract for the rational adjustment of labor controversies. The contracting firm employs many skilled mechanics about whose loyalty to the government there has never been any question. A short time before the contract was let these

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mechanics had been organized into a solid local of one of the best conducted unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. The policy of the firm is opposed to trade-unionism. The acceptance of this contract for munitions, the need of which was pressing, was made the occasion to aim a blow at the organization of the men. It is understood that the contract was let on a cost *plus* basis. This called for an inventory involving the laying-off of the men for two weeks without pay. There was no objection to this; the men are accustomed to being laid off without pay while necessary inventories are taken. But they are also accustomed to return to work without prejudice when the stock-taking is finished. In announcing this inventory, the firm ordered the men to remove their tools from the plant and advised them that it would mail written notice to such of them as it wanted back. The men, knowing of the firm's hostility to their union, naturally interpreted this extraordinary procedure as a lock-out and answered it by declaring a strike. They say that they have been threatened with troops on the ground that their action is a treasonable interference with the conduct of the war. They in turn hold that the firm's attempt to use a government contract as a cover for disrupting their organization is unpatriotic or worse. Meanwhile work on essential military supplies is halted. If the men are beaten, they will almost inevitably join the forces of the disaffected. Had this contract included a clause for the adjustment of labor controversies such as that under which the adjustment board in the shipbuilding industry will act, an ugly situation might have been averted.

Conspiracies to harass the government by the reckless and disloyal fomenting of strikes ought to be put down with a strong hand. But raids and grand juries like policemen's clubs need to be used with utmost discrimination. It is an old saying among the soap-box orators that the crack of a policeman's billy on an innocent head registers a radical vote at the polls. The Department of Justice has given refreshing evidence that at least one arm of the government has a clear-cut labor policy. Thousands of wage-workers both in and outside of the American Federation of Labor would have their loyalty strengthened if they knew that government contracts were not by any possibility going to be used to exploit them or to brand them with the I. W. W. iron the moment they ventured to protest their valid grievances. No cumbersome machinery such as an all-inclusive national labor adjustment board is called for; all that is needed is the incorporation in all contracts let by or for the government of a clause providing for the democratic adjustment of controversies in the particular plant or industry affected by the contract. Why should it be considered impossible to apply as a national policy the precedents which have already been established in the clothing and shipbuilding trades?

Ours Not to Reason Why

THE Outlook has undertaken to portray for its readers a seditious and disloyal sheet which it terms The New Republic. This sheet, as it appears, is giving aid and comfort to the enemy. It has a mind eager to believe evil of Great Britain, to repeat slander against Great Britain and to air ancient grievances. It is also engaged in misrepresenting American ideals. As evidence against this dastardly organ our neighbor cites the offense that The New Republic mistakenly condemned as British propaganda a cartoon which had in fact emanated from Hearst. The Outlook admits that the cartoon was brutal and stupid, "a libel on the spirit of America," but it contends that The New Republic took it as British instead of American out of "eagerness to believe evil of an ally."

As an imaginary portrait of a malicious journal, this production of the Outlook has merit. As a likeness of The New Republic it is somewhat fatuous. If there is one journal in the United States which has been steadily denounced for its unwillingness to believe evil of Great Britain, it is The New Republic. It has long been a commonplace of German-American papers that The New Republic is a Morgan house-organ, bought by British gold, run in the interests of England. It is as well known to these German-American papers as it is to the Manchester Guardian or the London Nation that the advocacy of an Anglo-American alliance has been continuous on the part of The New Republic—a sinister move, as the German papers see it, to have America pull English chestnuts out of the fire. The Germania of Milwaukee gleaned from these columns the real reason why The New Republic was seized of what Max Eastman called "a highly intellectualized lust for bloody combat." It was "to save England." "George Washington would open his eyes," says his Milwaukee spokesman, "if he could behold that." And our whole attitude to the Allies continues to draw tributes from the German-Americans. One of them writes this week in acknowledgment of our sustained aid and comfort:

> "To read your paper now is nauseous to me and I have instructed my butler to put it into the furnace without removing the wrapper. But don't fail to send it as long as I have paid for it. It is an enjoyment to see the flames lick up the writings if not the writer."

How can the Outlook misunderstand a position so indisputable and so conspicuous? It is not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

malice that makes for such a mistake, for malice is more ingenious. It is stupidity, hurtful to itself, coming directly from the Outlook's assumption that in war-time it is seditious and disloyal to think. "Ours not to reason why"—that is the sole editorial formula of the Outlook. It is the attempt to apply goose-step technique to public opinion in the disastrous persuasion that wars must be won by dragooning minds and hearts as well as disciplining hands and feet.

To close one's mind now and forever on the issues of the war, to exclude in every way the possibility of eventual peace, to deal in nothing but propaganda, to threaten with death anyone who estimates German strength favorably or suggests that our associates in the war are capable of falling short of perfection—these are the requirements of patriotism as the Outlook preaches it with every encouragement to lynch law in the background. And it specifies for condemnation these chief ways of helping the enemy:

"1. To make the issues of the war seem confused, or sordid, or foreign to the interests of the American people.

"2. To create or foster the feeling that America and her friends cannot win, and that Germany and her satellites are too strong to be beaten.

"3. To arouse in the minds of Americans suspicion and distrust of our allies, and thus to bring about disunion."

If you have the patience to substitute the word "German" for the word "American" in these three definitions you not only get a perfect prescription for the worst Prussian automaton but you get an excellent assurance of everlasting war. There is no newspaper in the inmost circles of authoritarian Germany that could have devised simpler recipes for prohibiting thought.

The Outlook may answer; you believe our cause is just, you believe in fighting to win, you believe war itself is a righteous process in this crisis—how can you be willing to entertain any possibility that our cause is debatable, our arms questionable, the process terminable, unless you are a "sapper and miner" of morale?

What the Outlook ignores, with misrepresentation of The New Republic as a consequence, is the very nature of morale. No engineer is so literal as to jam steel rails end to end. He lays them with the nature of his material in mind, with due allowance for expansion and contraction. No such calculation as to needful elasticity is conceived by the Outlook when it comes to recommend its mental strait-jacket for Americans. And yet, so circumscribing the field of ideas that the least departure from conventional patriotism becomes persecuted heresy, the Outlook would be the first to maintain that this is a war of ideas, the inference being that every American of course knows without freedom to speculate just what ideas are right.

It is convenient to hinge an accusation of disloyalty on the failure of The New Republic to "verify the original source" of a cartoon. A failure to verify original sources is regrettable, but not heinous. Otherwise we should feel more indignant at the fact that in the issue of the Outlook that takes us to task, a story is credited to the Saturday Evening Post which ought to be credited to The New Republic. The fundamental point is the falsification of a petty issue by the Outlook because it has embarked on a mistaken advocacy of the conscription of thought.

It can't be done. As John Dewey has recently intimated, conscription of mind is simply not efficacious as a means of promoting solidarity. On the contrary, "there is not a tithe of the danger to our effective participation in the war from those who think wildly and erratically that there is from those who do not think enough. Even if the President is prepared to come forward at the right time with the wisest of all possible peace measures, we shall have missed the greatest contribution which the war has to make to our future national integrity, if these measures come before a people intellectually unprepared and apathetic. We shall then have the physical fact of peace whatever it may be, but not its meaning."

The animadversions of the Outlook are important as affording an example of warped observation. There is only one cure for such a tendency to suspicion and oversensitiveness and hysteria. It is to think less about dragooning the country into solidarity, to realize more that there is no such thing as democracy, if a solid front necessitates a solid head.

The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1917, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT, ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER.

EDITORS

HERBERT CROLY — FRANCIS HACKETT
PHILIP LITTELL — ALVIN JOHNSON
GEORGE SOULE—Assistant Editor
CHARLES MERZ, Washington Representative

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FOUR DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES TEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FOUR DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, FIVE DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE: REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER.

ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Future of the State

FEW incidents of the present war require for their adequate understanding a larger historical perspective than the recent circular letter of the Pope on behalf of peace. It was generally interpreted as an attempt to save the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which remains the one indisputably loyal political accomplice of the Catholic Church, from the triumph of its enemies; and no doubt His Holiness was moved to address his plea to the Powers in part by a foreboding of the damage which the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary would work upon the Church. But whatever the immediate political reason, the act itself demands much more of an explanation. In launching his plea for peace the Pope was alive to Catholic interests more far-reaching than those which might be compromised by the passing of the Hapsburgs. His intervention in the war has the exceptional significance which must attach to a difficult and hazardous enterprise undertaken after long deliberation by the oldest and most self-conscious center of organized authority in the world. In order to understand it we must bear in mind the way in which ardent Catholics conceive of the mission of their Church, and the vicissitudes through which Catholicism has passed since the great schism. The Pope's letter will figure in history as the beginning of a stubborn attempt made by Catholicism as a pretender to ultimate authority to take advantage of the costly blundering of its secular rivals and to regain for the Catholic hierarchy some of its lost or waning prestige.

Let us try to look at the present situation from the point of view of a Church which aspires to be universal and authoritative and whose prelates are distinguished by the length of their official memories and the tenacity with which they pursue ulterior purposes. Like other intelligent men they have come to realize what stupendous issues are hanging on the outcome and duration of the present war. They see before them a society which is passing through one of the rare historical transformations, during which the empire of one group of traditions and convictions is found wanting and the way prepared for the substitution of another and probably a very different group. Nothing less than the prevailing methods of social and political organization, the accepted conditions of associated action, the very foundations of individual obligation and collective authority, will be called into question by the result of the present war. An institution possessing the traditions and pretensions of the Catholic Church cannot remain passive and indifferent during such a critical moment in the history of civilization. The Pope is supposed to be the earthly representative of a Divine Order, which possesses an infallible recipe for the spiritual ills of mankind. If he and his hierarchy do not play a more aggressive part during the present distress than they did during the wars of the French Revolution, their ineptitude would be equivalent to abdication.

Ever since the Reformation and the religious wars the Catholic hierarchy has been occupying an increasingly equivocal and precarious position. In spite of the large number of professing Catholics, in spite of the inability of the Greek Church or any of the Protestant sects to win Catholic converts, Catholicism as an embodiment on earth of the City of God has been steadily losing ground. Its real competitor has not been Protestantism but secularism and the state, and against the state both Protestantism and Catholicism have become increasingly impotent. In Protestant countries Erastianism is accepted with but little protest by the great majority of sincere Christians, and the scruples which it arouses among a few clerics and political theorists have been practically negligible. In Catholic countries the state is scarcely less supreme. The Catholic hierarchy could not admit the supremacy of political authority, but at best it has attempted to control rather than to challenge the state, and at worst it has pleaded for toleration and the freedom of religious and moral instruction. While Catholicism has not renounced its pretensions, it has postponed any attempt to assert them; and if its recent timid and conciliatory policy should be continued for another generation or two, the pretensions of the Pope as the Vice-Regent of God and the Church as the repository of Divine authority would be damaged beyond repair by the failure to assert them and by the growing arrogance of the state. When the war broke out Catholicism was drifting on to the rocks of an exhaustive and dangerous dilemma. It must either resist the tide of secularization and insist upon the need of a supreme religious authority, independent of the state and superior to it, or else acquiesce in the loss of vitality which inevitably accompanies the inability either to assert or to abandon a great pretension.

The war has presented to the Catholic Church a seductive opportunity of undermining the authority of the state and possibly of recovering some of its own prestige. Sincere Catholics may well consider the ruin, the suffering and the disenchantment

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the past few years to be the proper fruits of an increasingly secularized political and social organization. During its long period of domination the state has systematically suppressed any competition with its own power from whatever source; yet hitherto it has proved unable to furnish its citizens with the essential conditions of security and progress. The war has merely disclosed a fatal malady which has long been fermenting in the moral composition of the modern world. Its essential tragedy does not consist in its harvest of intense and widespread suffering or its oppressive legacy of national debt and international animosity but in the maleficent frustration of so much human life at the bidding on the part of all the warring nations of so much righteous conviction. This bloodshed and the suffering, this deliberate sacrifice of human beings on the altar of righteous patriotic motives, are not to be avoided so long as ultimate authority is distributed among a multiplicity of factious, incomplete and irresponsible secular organizations. The only way out, so Catholics can plausibly claim, is an access of humility on the part of the state, which is inconceivable unless governments recognize their subordination to some universal and unimpeachable source of spiritual authority.

State-worshippers, who are alive to the defects in the present operation of the secular state, propose to do away with these defects, not by limiting the power of the state but by universalizing it. They propose to adjust the political unit of the nation to a supernational organization. Such a solution cannot be acceptable to Catholicism. From its point of view the danger which threatens the moral progress of mankind as a consequence of the arrogance and irresponsibility of political authority would merely be intensified by the successful creation of a universal state. In that event instead of having quarrels among states, in which all the partisans could claim the benefit of righteous motives, there would be revolutions and civil wars within the world state, which would raise an analogous moral dilemma. What the civilized world needs is the unity of an authoritative spiritual organization and the subordination thereto of all secular authority. The universal state is no doubt necessary, as Catholic philosophers anticipated when they envisaged the Holy Roman Empire, but if it were achieved, it would call the more loudly for an independent and supreme organization of spiritual authority. Systematic and shameless secularism is responsible for the existing malady of civilization, and unless something is done to overpower the irresponsible and irreligious state, and domesticate it as a mere beast of burden in the City of God, the world will eventually relapse into barbarism.

Such must be the Catholic contention, and the recent peace initiative of the Pope is a preliminary expression of underlying purpose. The Catholic hierarchy does not as yet feel strong enough to challenge its secular rivals; but it is trying to reap some benefit from their blundering, and if the war lasts much longer it may well succeed. A revival of Catholic propaganda during the near future may be confidently predicted. It is now or never for Catholicism. The Church might remain quiescent under the rivalry of secular authorities which were divided one against the other, but if there is to be supernational political organization, Catholicism must assert its theoretic pretensions, or find itself gradually deprived of its existing authority over its own adherents. Thus the opportunity presented to the Church by the tragedy of the war is both tempting and dangerous. Catholics may be right in attributing the great disaster to state irresponsibility and irreligion. They may be justified in claiming that a universal state will make increasingly severe demands upon the moral competence of its citizens and will require even more than does the particularist state of to-day an effective system of popular moral and religious education. But as a consequence of insisting on the claim, they are risking the existing authority of their own organization on their ability to make it good. Even if they are justified in challenging the moral foundation of the state, the state is not limited in its retort to resignation or futile protest. It can answer by developing another method of popular moral instruction inimical to the Catholic method and exclusive of it. The Catholic hierarchy must succeed in undermining the authority of the state and increasing its own prestige or else its pretensions and the educational system associated with them will scarcely be tolerated in the future as they have been in the past.

Secularists, who do not fear a revival of the Catholic autocracy, will none the less do ill to underestimate the force of the criticism which Catholics will make against the arrogance of political authority. In spite of all that the secular state has accomplished for civilization during its period of supremacy, it is proving to be an unnecessarily powerful and dangerous servant and an unnecessarily jealous master. In so far as men act upon their political theories and convictions, ultimate disaster and disintegration is certain to result from the creation of an indefinite number of states, each one of which is independent, sovereign, and entitled to the unqualified allegiance of its own citizens. Such a method of organizing ultimate authority is an invitation both to political and moral anarchy. It is bound to divide nations into fanatical political sects, whose security and growth

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tend to depend upon their power of aggression, and whose citizens can kill each other with almost as clear a conscience as the Mohammedan killed the Christian or the Calvinist killed the Catholic. Neither can the baleful results of such a method of organizing ultimate authority be escaped merely by substituting for the many petty sovereigns of to-day one all-embracing super-sovereign. The essential evil arises from the attribution in all modern nations of moral sovereignty to physically powerful states without any sufficient assurance of the use of the power for genuinely social purposes. Unless I am much mistaken states must, as a result of the war, consent to a diminution and a redistribution of authority as the one indispensable condition of an increase in grace.

In a letter published in this issue Mr. Alfred Zimmern reads into the war a different lesson. It will result, in his opinion, in an enhancement of the authority and prestige of the state. "One of its surprises has been its demonstration of the hold of the political state on the loyalty of the average man"; and he appraises this loyalty as a testimony to "men's sense of the value of statehood" rather than as an expression of unthinking patriotism or the fever of war. Mr. Zimmern cannot be denied when he imputes to the war a demonstration of the grip seized by the state on the obedience of the average man, but what the experience of the war has not demonstrated and cannot demonstrate is the unimpaired continuation of this past prestige. After the religious conflicts of the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries a partisan of religious dogma might have expatiated with much plausibility upon the demonstration afforded by those wars of the iron grip which had been fastened by religious authority on the average man, and he might have inferred, as Mr. Zimmern now does in reference to the state, that as a result of the sacrifices made on its behalf, the authority of religious convictions and organizations would be enhanced. Such a partisan of creeds and churches would have been right in his facts but wrong in his inferences. The actual effect of the sacrifices made by men on behalf of their religion was a diminution in the hold exercised by religious authority on the human conscience and the substitution for its dominion of a new secular kingship. Men began to inquire how far fanatical religious creeds and organizations were worth all they were costing, and how far religious faith could be promoted by killing other men for its benefit. Discomfited by these inquiries, they turned to the state in the hope of finding under its protection a deliverance from the burden of such an exacting master as an exclusive religious creed or church.

Surely men will inquire after the war is over whether the state as now organized is not proving to be as costly and jealous a master as the churches formerly were, and how far it is worth all that it is costing. Such questions were being asked before the war began by the spokesmen of a numerous and formidable fraction of the community, who considered the existing state to be essentially a middle-class organization and who denied that it had deserved the undivided allegiance of the wage-earners. The war has served to sharpen rather than to assuage the criticism of the industrially disfranchised part of the community. They will emerge from it with an increasing sense of their power, of the debt owed by the community to them, and of the necessity of combining and exerting their power in order to secure their recognition as one indispensable element in the national composition. They will become increasingly attached to centers of allegiance and social activity other than the state. There will be built up within nations class, trade and professional associations which will compete with the state for the loyalty of its citizens. In this way the prestige of the state will be impaired, much as the prestige of the churches was impaired after the religious wars. A formidable reaction will set in against the arrogance of an idol which demanded so many sacrifices of property, feeling and life, without affording any sufficient guaranty that these burnt offerings would effectively contribute to the future welfare of mankind or to the glory of God.

Mr. Zimmern regards with profound distrust any tendency to impair state authority and to supplement stateism with syndicalism. He is opposed to federalism within the state just as Catholics were opposed to federalism within the Church, and for precisely the same reason. It invites the danger of a divided allegiance. "A state in which the majority of its citizens or even a substantial minority doubted to which authority their supreme allegiance was due," would, he says, "soon cease to be a state at all." "Political allegiance necessarily takes precedence over all others because it embraces the common sources of the whole community," and in Mr. Zimmern's opinion there is one kind of state which embodies the common concern of the whole community. The democratic commonwealth "based on the idea of the welfare of all its members" is the consummate political type. The question as to whether such a commonwealth is worth all that it costs can be answered in advance. Its citizens can give their undivided allegiance to such a state with a flawless conscience because it exists only to promote "the cause of free government and the moral progress of humanity"; and if they do not dedicate all they have and are to its service, it cannot survive in competition with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other states, which deserve less loyalty but receive more.

I agree with Mr. Zimmern in anticipating an invaluable contribution to the future welfare of mankind from the democratic commonwealth, but I cannot agree with his assumption that existing states, merely because they claim to embody the common concerns of the whole community, can be trusted as consummate servants of the moral progress of humanity. Mr. Zimmern's argument in favor of an undivided political allegiance runs closely parallel to the argument Catholics have always made in favor of an undivided ecclesiastical allegiance. Starting with the idea of a commonwealth which exists only to serve the public welfare and the moral progress of humanity, he attributes to existing states, which claim to be democratic, a sufficiently complete embodiment of this idea in practice. He argues that inasmuch as democratic commonwealths do exist and exist for noble purposes their survival must be assured at any cost, and since they cannot survive against existing competition without the undivided allegiance of their citizens, such allegiance must not only be granted but exacted. Surely the parentage of such reasoning is written on its face. It is sheer scholasticism. The state, as Mr. Zimmern conceives it, abhors divided allegiance just as nature was supposed to abhor a vacuum and for no better reason. Mr. Zimmern creates a new absolute moral sovereignty, whose embodiment is the democratic commonwealth, dedicated as the Catholic Church was supposed to be dedicated to the moral welfare of humanity; and he endows the new sovereign with all the privileges and attributes of the old ecclesiastical vice-regency. Thus he deprives democracy of the tentative experimental and chiefly educative character which constitutes its peculiar merit and which in actual practice has served to mitigate the excessive and exclusive pretensions of the states, in which it is now housed. If the great state is to serve the purposes which Mr. Zimmern wishes it to serve, it will have to do so, not by claiming an undivided allegiance which would stamp it as a jealous and an overbearing monarch, replete with the sacrifices of the faithful, but by inviting the competition which is necessary to its own moral vitality.

Mr. Zimmern's thinking is hurt by the assumption of an indefinite perpetuation of the existing condition of war, in which democracy is fighting for its right to live. No doubt the democratic commonwealth could not survive in rivalry with an enemy which obtained from its adherents undivided loyalty, unless it insisted upon an analogous tribute from its own citizens, but the assumed conditions would in any event be fatal. A democratic commonwealth which was continually fighting for life against enemies, either domestic or foreign, and which was obliged permanently to conscript the lives and allegiance of its citizens, could not avoid becoming a Jacobin democracy. A liberal democracy requires a more favorable soil and a more temperate climate. Its citizens cannot be satisfied with a choice between absolutism and anarchy, between an all-devouring allegiance and no allegiance, between an indivisible state and a state divided hopelessly against itself. The democratic commonwealth has been the product of some measure of security from domestic and foreign enemies, a security which has permitted it to assume the risk of competition without being panic-stricken by its possible consequences. The war is now being fought to provide additional guaranties for the security of pacific nations. If it results in a victory for democracy, they can afford to go farther than they have done in the past in permitting competition within their own families and against their own authority.

If the democratic commonwealth is to make its full contribution to the political welfare of mankind, it must avoid arrogance and self-satisfaction as it would the ultimate sin. An autocratic state may escape from competition by the easy expedient of disqualifying its competitors, but a democracy has no use for cheap and easy victories. It needs to be more sportsmanlike. It must disarm the enmity of its rivals by giving them a clear legal right to exist, and by allowing them to have independent interests and wills of their own. At present these rivals of the state within the state are weak, because statesmen, taking counsel of fears and jealous of their own authority, have starved and mutilated them. The result has been to stimulate the one impossible kind of competition. Like all weak but irresponsible adversaries, the competitors within the state have been driven to a certain violence of protest. Democracies, and above all the American democracy, have almost savagely prevented the growth within the nation of corporate bodies whose competition the government would have any reason to fear. Their political philosophy, inherited from Rousseau, has been a contradictory combination of individualism and indivisibility, which has persuaded them to discriminate against supplementary centers of allegiance. Their leaders have failed to understand to what extent a strong and coherent national organization must be the reflection not only of independence of character on the part of individual citizens, but of equally genuine independence on the part of those associations which represent its fundamental industrial and social activities. The legal recognition of such associations constitutes the best possible guaranty against

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the arrogance and abuse either of state power or of the power of any particular professional or trade association. In so far as they are allowed to flourish and attain their full strength, they will need the state as a correspondingly strong agency of coördination; and for this very reason the state should seek to strengthen them when they are weak, and so to obtain a secure foundation for its own legitimate authority and for the allegiance of its citizens.

I am not writing as one who disbelieves in political methods and institutions and who seeks to do away with their existing influence on the lives of men and women. If democracy were confined to an exclusive choice between an indivisible state and a dismembered society, I would accept the former as the alternative which probably would allow a larger measure of human development. But it is not confined to such a choice, and if it were, the moral authority of the state could never be anything more than the glorified and falsified incarnation of successful force. The democratic commonwealth is bound to seek above everything else moral authority, and authority of this kind it can obtain only by relaxing the use of its physical power and by earning rather than conscripting the allegiance of its citizens. If it insists on too much physical preponderance, its moral preponderance cannot help but suffer. If it wishes to deserve moral preponderance, it must be discreet and generous in the exercise of its physical power. By behaving in this way, by permitting the growth within the states of possible rivals which are themselves centers of organized power and allegiance, the state will be adopting the most promising means of associating eventually with itself an adequate system of moral and social education for its citizens. For it would be providing under modern industrial conditions for a renewal of that mutually helpful relation between individual and public interest, which, as Mr. Zimmern has himself so eloquently set forth, existed for one brief moment in the life of the Attic commonwealth.

HERBERT CROLY.

Coöperating with Washington

DURING the war a new way has been built to unite the government at Washington with the several states of the Union and with the counties and other sub-divisions within the states. It is a way that is very useful during the war; and it is a way that may, perhaps, after the war lead us on to a greater permanent unity than we have ever before had between our national life and our local life.

It begins with the "Section on Coöperation with States" in our Council of National Defense at Washington, a section managed by Mr. George F. Porter, of Chicago. It extends to a "state council of defense" (sometimes called by some other name) in every one of the states. It goes beyond that state council in most cases to councils in counties. And it often goes beyond the councils in counties to councils in cities, in towns, in townships.

An impulse from Washington in the matter of recruiting, in the matter of the care of soldiers' families, in the matter of the reduction of the number of daily deliveries from retail stores, in the matter of the organization of boys' working reserves, in the matter of food conservation or of labor standards or of man-power censuses or of foreign-born citizens, in any matter of national policy, can now be transmitted promptly and routinely to groups of local persons organized for the special purpose of coöperating with the national government to national ends. The Army and Navy Departments may have their recruiting stations, the Red Cross its local chapters, the Commercial Economy Board its correspondents, the Department of Labor its agents, usefully and indispensably established up and down throughout the land Each of these activities remains one activity, one facet of national policy. The new local councils are composite centers through which national policy in all its parts can be comprehended and interpreted and diffused as a whole among the whole people.

The methods followed in creating these councils have been characteristic of the infinite variety of our American scene. The state councils, to begin with, were some of them brought into existence by acts of legislatures, but many by mere administrative acts of governors. Governors often found that their legislatures were not in session and were not due to be in session for a year or more to come; and they were therefore compelled to proceed on their own responsibility; and they did so proceed; but they were of course confronted with great difficulties in giving their appointed councils either an adequate amount of power or an adequate amount of money. We exceed most people of the world in our belief in the happy simultaneous recurrence of legislative and astronomical crises. The legislature of Alabama meets just once in four years. It met last about a year ago. It will meet next three years from now. And the world may arrange its wars accordingly.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The states differ also in their views of the relative merits of the aphorisms that too many cooks spoil the broth, and that in a multitude of counselors there is wisdom. Some state councils have as many as one hundred members and even as many as two hundred. Others have as few as six.

They come to agreement, to approximate agreement, at just one point. Virtually every state council (the exceptions and the seeming exceptions are very few) is dominantly a body of citizens chosen from outside the ranks of the state's elected public officials to serve the present emergency in a manner designed in principle to be thoroughly non-partisan.

In their powers they begin to vary again. In West Virginia, where clearly all indigenous dread of Strong Government has at least temporarily disappeared, the Council may regulate railroads, regulate mines, regulate factories, fix the prices of foods and fuels, suppress insurrections and rebellions and "in general take such steps as may be necessary or advisable for the public defense and security." In Wisconsin the Council may incidentally lay its hands upon foods and fuels, seize them, store them, distribute them; and it may in certain circumstances issue a call for a special session of the state legislature. In Minnesota the Council may "do all acts and things" "necessary for the public safety not inconsistent with the constitution or laws of the state or of the United States." Such powers, however, are exceptional. The main original purpose of the state councils is precisely the main original purpose of the committee of the central Council of National Defense at Washington. It is to mass and focus the energies of private life on public national needs. The powers considered appropriate for this purpose in current legislation of good average strength are simply to organize war activities among the citizens of the state, to make public inquiries under oath, to present public recommendations to the governor or to the legislature, to coöperate with the Council of National Defense, and to require coöperation from all local municipal authorities.

To get this local coöperation it soon seemed desirable to create special local defense bodies and to give us our present quite amazing array of them, amazing in numbers and amazing in methods. In Indiana the State Council authorized the Judge of the Circuit Court in each county to appoint a county council of defense in which, admirably but unusually, there must be one member who directly represents labor. In California the State Council named four office-holders in each county to select three non-office-holders to form together a county council of seven. In Wisconsin, which is still resolved to yield to no European country, Prussian or other, in documented organization, the Governor is empowered to create county councils of defense; the regular county authorities are empowered to levy taxes to support the activities of the county councils of defense; the State Council publishes a weekly periodical to instruct the county councils and to exchange information between them; and the county councils make weekly reports to the State Council on printed forms full of questions covering the activities which the State Council has recommended. In Florida the local organizations take the form of "Food Preparedness Commissions," consisting in part of public officials and in larger part of private citizens from such bodies as the Bankers' Association, the Teachers' Association and the Farmers' Union. These "Food Preparedness Commissions" in each county in Florida give birth to similar commissions, subordinate ones, in each sub-division of each county, just as the county "councils of defense" have given birth to township "councils of defense" in Wisconsin and in many other states.

It is a capillary system, continually extending itself from its heart at the city of Washington to another hamlet, another crossroads; and, when its state branches, its county branches, its sub-county branches are all considered, it clearly constitutes, for national sentiment alone, a national educational agency of unique present and one may hope prophetic value.

In its activities to-day this agency touches on things military, things industrial, things agricultural, things of information and of opinion about the war; and, in many intimate ways, it touches on them with a homely, friendly hand that Washington, remote and immersed in general impersonal plans, could never stretch out. In North Carolina, for instance, the State Council has requested each county council to appoint a "Soldiers' Business Aid Committee" of six members, including a banker, a lawyer and a commercial business man, to offer all necessary assistance in the management of the business affairs of soldiers absent on duty. There may be insurance policies with premiums that must be paid. There may be mortgages with interest-charges that must be met. There may be law-suits that must be defended or prosecuted. And, when the soldier comes back, if his old employment is not there for him, there must be a new employment ready for him on the moment of his return.

Here is a neighborly service supplementing and transcending "relief." It might grow to "overlap" the work of the Red Cross a bit; but surely the Red Cross, under its present practical management, will not permit itself to become too scientific. There are traces of mania of the worst sort, of the scientific sort, in some of the present otherwise highly valuable campaign against "duplication of effort." If certain of our extremists had been con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sulted, we should by no means now have gospels by St. Matthew, St. Mark, St. Luke and St. John. We should have had a Board, a Binet-Simon Psychological Laboratory Board, to pick St. Luke, who had a scientific training, and to reduce the papyrus bills of the Church by rejecting the other three, especially St. John, who seems to have been subject to hallucinations, whom Jesus inexplicably loved. "Duplication of effort" in certain things, in things of the body and of the instant, in milk-deliveries, in orders in battle, is often very bad. In certain other things it is often very good; and among such other things is the coming outpouring of neighborly spirit toward the families of the men who have gone to France. Those families cannot live by bread alone.

So in Wisconsin the State Council has proposed to the county councils that for every soldier abroad there should be a "Home Soldier," who shall think of the soldier abroad as his personal representative there, and who shall think of himself as that soldier's personal representative here, watching over his interests and his family's interests, his children's welfare, the receipt of his moneys, the dispatch to him of special remembrances in messages and in gifts of personal equipment and comfort from his friends left behind, personal services one man to one man. So may the home-fires burn to the burning of the camp-fires.

In things industrial and agricultural, as in things military, the doings of the councils can be only illustrated and not recounted in detail; for their volume is the volume of the nation's sudden sense of the importance nationally of all its local interests. In Illinois the State Council makes a prompt inquiry into the coal industry and shows that in the year from June, 1916, to June, 1917, labor cost went up only about twenty cents a ton while price went up about two dollars a ton, thus stripping the coal operators of their breastplate argument. In Ohio the State Council establishes a coal clearing-house into which the operators agree to allocate some 6,000,000 tons of coal for next winter's household use. In Arizona, in Utah, in Massachusetts, in Connecticut, the State Councils buy seeds and re-sell them to farmers at cost. In Connecticut this buying and reselling is done on a scale and in a manner to stabilize the whole seed market. In Rhode Island the State Council lends money to farmers for seed purchases out of a loan fund of $50,000. In Massachusetts the State Council establishes camps, "supervised" camps, for boys joining the Boys' Working Reserve for service during vacations on farms. In all states the state councils and the county councils and the sub-county councils receive and spread the recommendations steadily received from the Council of National Defense at Washington with regard to promoting the Boys' Working Reserve, the liberty loans, women's defense work, the manning of the army and navy, patriotic celebrations, the stopping of returns of unsold bread from retailers to bakers, the organizing of "Four Minute Men" to carry the message of the war in short flashes to moving picture audiences—recommendations of scores of sorts, sometimes original with Washington and sometimes gathered by Washington from one state and laid at the disposal of all the others.

Under Mr. Porter's urgent but very sound and very unhysterical management of the "Section on Coöperation with States," certain activities have been officially discouraged and others have been given the momentum of full official sanction. The education of the country about the war so comes to be one of the greatest of the activities in view. In many states the state councils organize "speakers' bureaus" to send men and women of authoritative reputations into the farthest corners of the remotest districts to explain the war, its issues, its needs. In certain states in the South special "publicity committees" of negroes are formed to reach the negro population personally. In New York and in Missouri and in Connecticut, as well as in Wisconsin, the state council takes to issuing a weekly periodical of things done, of things planned. In certain counties in the West a central telephone operator at a certain hour each day tells the latest news of local "preparedness" to all who choose to listen in.

This local touch, this personal touch, between the "preparedness" of Washington and the "preparedness" of the rest of the country makes the war live for millions of our citizens as it could never live for them on the pages of their ordinary local and national periodicals. Mr. James A. B. Scherer, President of Throop Institute in California, makes a tour of the South, from Washington, representing the "Section on Coöperation with States." He comes to Atlanta. He finds the Senate and the House of the Georgia legislature in joint session to consider the need of certain arrangements about the State Council of Defense. They are in doubt about the need. Mr. Scherer addresses them. He speaks of his German ancestry, of his pro-German upbringing, of his return to Germany, of what he saw, of how the old Germany is bitted by Prussia, of why the war is, of why it must be, of why his son is in it. They see the need, then, because they see him, and they accept it in an ovation for him.

It was an occasion for Emil Zimmermann to ponder, who proposes in a recent issue of the German periodical März, to punish the United States by simply having the German government cause all our

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

citizens of German descent to shake our hated dust off their feet and emigrate to Central and South America! It was an occasion unmanageable by the printed word. It needed a person.

Perhaps therefore the "speakers' bureaus" are indeed the highest present work of our new system of local defense councils. Beyond that work, though, and beyond all their other more tangible material work, lies the thought that they have built a way along which our local governments, segregated in spirit as no local governments in Britain or France or Germany are segregated from the national capital, are now connected to that capital with a very considerable directness—a thought leading to the hope that some such way, enlarged and regularized, may remain with us when the war is over.

WILLIAM HARD.

Validity of the Child Labor Act

THE Keating-Owen Child Labor act, which was passed by Congress one year ago, provides that "no producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall ship or deliver for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce any article or commodity the product of any mine or quarry in the United States in which, within thirty days prior to the time of removal of such product therefrom, children under the age of sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work; or any article or commodity the product of any mill, cannery, workshop, factory," etc., "in which, within thirty days prior to the removal of such product therefrom, children under the age of fourteen years have been employed, or children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years have been employed . . . more than eight hours in any day or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of 7 o'clock p.m. or before the hour of 6 a.m."

This law was to become operative on the first day of the current month, but the day previous Judge Boyd of the Western District of North Carolina came to the rescue of the country and the Constitution by pronouncing it void. The Times account of the decision says:

> In announcing his decision Judge Boyd said he was gratified by the candor of Professor Thomas I. Parkinson of Columbia University, representing the Department of Justice, who asserted that Congress had used its power over interstate commerce for the object of regulation of local conditions within the state and the discouragement of child labor. This admission, said the Judge, left the issue clear and brought forward the question: "Can Congress do by indirection that which it undoubtedly cannot do directly?"
>
> "Congress," he said, "can regulate trade among the states, but not the internal conditions of labor."

The decision turns, therefore, either upon the assumption that courts are entitled to pass upon the propriety of the motives of Congress in enacting legislation brought up for review, or that Congress may not exercise its powers when its doing so will affect matters controllable by the states. The latter proposition is absurd—by it Congressional power would be kept in perpetual refrigeration; and the former proposition has been repeatedly rejected by the Court. In McCray v. U. S. (195 U. S. 27), an act imposing a tax of ten cents a pound on all oleomargarine artificially colored to resemble butter was attacked on the ground that the purpose of Congress in enacting it had been not to raise revenue but to suppress the manufacture of the taxed article, and that the power to regulate the manufacture and sale of commodities was one that belonged solely to the states. The act was sustained, the Court saying: The objection, "if sustained, would destroy all distinction between the powers of the respective departments of the government. . . . It is of course true, as suggested, that if there be no authority in the judiciary to restrain a lawful exercise of power by another department of the government, where a wrong motive or purpose has impelled to the exertion of the power, that abuses of a power conferred may be temporarily effectual. The remedy for this, however, lies not in the abuse by the judicial authority of its functions but in the people, upon whom, after all, under our institutions, reliance must be placed for the correction of abuses committed in the exercise of a lawful power. . . . The decisions of this Court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exercised."

Furthermore, the admission which Judge Boyd thinks he has from the government counsel that the purpose of the Child Labor act was the regulation of local conditions within the states was, if made, quite gratuitous and essentially erroneous. It is the object of this act not to regulate conditions of labor within the states individually, for these are primarily of concern only to the states, but to establish a certain plane of competition with respect to the utilization of child labor for the benefit of the country at large. Under the previous anarchic system it was within the power of a few backward communities to make it impossible for the progressive states to maintain rational standards of child labor except at great economic sacrifice, since it is always the tendency of invest-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment capital to seek those regions where for one cause or another the cost of labor is lowest. In short, Congress's immediate motive was not the protection of the children of Georgia, South Carolina, and Alabama from the heartlessness and imbecility of the legislatures of those states, but the protection of the children of the rest of the country from conditions which the electorate of the nation alone can reach through the national powers.

The question raised by the Child Labor act boils down simply to this: May Congress exercise its undoubted power to regulate commerce among the states for what it considers the good of the country at large, even to the extent of prohibiting certain branches of commerce which from this point of view it deems detrimental? The same question was raised with reference to President Jefferson's Embargo measures more than a century ago. The argument was offered against the Embargo that, far from promoting commerce, it destroyed it, and that Congress's power over commerce was intended to be exercised for the benefit of commerce and not for other ends. Judge Davis of the United States District Court of Massachusetts answered the argument by pointing to the Preamble of the Constitution. He said: "The power to regulate commerce is not to be confined to the adoption of measures exclusively beneficial to commerce itself, or tending to its advantage; but under our system, as in all modern sovereignties, it is also to be considered as an instrument for other purposes of general policy and interest. . . . The situation of the United States in ordinary times might render legislative interferences relative to commerce less necessary, but the capacity and power of managing and directing it for the advancement of great national purposes seems an important ingredient of sovereignty." Judge Davis then cited the constitutional clause interdicting a prohibition of the slave trade until 1808. This, said he, proved clearly the view of the framers of the Constitution, "that under the power to regulate commerce, Congress would be authorized to abridge it in favor of the great principles of humanity and justice." (The William L. Hall's Law Journal, 255.)

In the great leading case of Gibbons vs. Ogden (9 Wheat. 1) Chief Justice Marshall refers to Judge Davis's decision with approval, then proceeds to set forth an even more sweeping view of Congress's power over commerce. What, he inquires, is this power, a question which he answers as follows:

> It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution. These are expressed in plain terms. . . . If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its Constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the Constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.

What, it may be asked, are the "plain terms" which Judge Boyd regards as condemning the Child Labor act? So far as can be gathered from the information at hand, he mentions none.

Unquestionably, there was a period during which the Court, indoctrinated with the states rights philosophy, was disposed to turn a cold shoulder toward Marshall's more liberal point of view, but this period is to-day past history. A recent utterance of the Court which is much in point is to be found in its decision sustaining the Mann act, which prohibits the transporting or assisting to transport any woman from one state to another for immoral purposes. Said Justice McKenna, speaking for the Court: "Plaintiffs in error . . . especially condemn the act under review as a subterfuge and an attempt to interfere with the police power of the states to regulate the morals of their citizens, and assert that it is in consequence an invasion of the reserved powers of the states. There is unquestionably a control in the states over the morals of their citizens. . . . It is a control, however, which can be exercised only within the jurisdiction of the states; but there is a domain which the states cannot reach and over which Congress alone has power, and if such power be exerted to control what the states cannot, it is an argument for—not against—its legality. . . .

"Our dual form of government has its perplexities, state and nation having different spheres of jurisdiction . . .; but it must be kept in mind that we are one people, and the powers reserved to the states and those conferred on the nation are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and moral." (277 U. S. 308.)

Following this line of reasoning the Court has from time to time sustained legislation forbidding the shipment in interstate commerce of obscene literature (in re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110), of lottery

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tickets (Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321), of impure food and drugs (Hipolyte Egg Co. v. U. S. 220, U. S. 45), and—recently—of liquor intended to be used at the destination, in violation of the State laws. These cases clearly yield the principle that Congress may always prevent the facility of interstate commerce from being made an instrument of evil, whether generally or locally. So the legal issue presented by the Child Labor act finally reduces itself to two questions of fact: First, is child labor carried on under the conditions discouraged by the act an evil? Secondly, does interstate commerce in the products of child labor, so carried on, tend to sustain and spread the evil? The answer to both questions is obvious, and so by the same token is the validity of the act.

Judge Boyd's decision cannot stand as law. It is a displaced fossil from a by-gone epoch of constitutionalism and as such merits a place in the cabinet of legal curiosities, but it deserves no weight whatever in the choice of current legislative programs to meet the vital needs of the day. And what makes it the more remarkable is that it should occur at a time when Congress is exercising other of its powers in a way to penetrate the local jurisdictions to their most intimate recesses. At a moment when the government is directing the mines, the factories and the farms of the nation, is saying what prices producers shall receive for their products, is conscripting the manhood of the country for the national armies, it is informed that it cannot regulate commerce with the end in view of conserving the health of those of whom its future armies must be composed. It is amazing.

EDWARD S. CORWIN.

On the Screen

TWO things I find that give the movies a promise of art. Both are imponderable. One is light, the creation of an expressive atmosphere. The other is sequence, the assembling of innumerable pictorial impressions in an order which not alone tells a story but reinforces it with a mental, almost a subconscious, gathering of details. It is manner, not matter, that makes a day of even the most routine of weekly "features" in some degree profitable. The stories may be no better than the traffic of stage and popular magazine. The technique of camera and scenario brings keen pleasure and keener promise into ten hours of such habitual screen-gazing as has been my bi-weekly duty as "photoplay editor" of a daily newspaper.

The first impression of the theatregoer at the movies used to be that, amid scores of flat, almost footlighted, scenes, the camera showed every now and then a lighting effect such as the American theatre had never risked and probably could not achieve. Generally it was the illuminating of an interior from a single point, as, for instance, a lantern or a candle. Thousands of striking lights and shadows filled the scene. They created an atmosphere of vivid life. Faces became more expressive, more beautiful or more hideous. Of course, it was not often that the action of a film gave excuse for this effect; only once in Morosco's Peer Gynt, for example, in the cabin scene, was the director who exploited this effect able to use it. But presently a producer, Cecil De Mille, and his art director, Wilfred Buckland, began to try something of the kind on almost all interior scenes. Instead of utilizing the filtered sunlight of open air studios, or the even glare of banks of Cooper Hewitts from top and sides, they threw their illumination in a great strong sheet from one or at the most two angles. The result was the brilliant "Lasky lighting" that the "movie fan" began to note in Farrar's Carmen.

Beginning at first as an "effect" on the level with prints in sepia, it has developed in the Lasky company's productions into something that heightens atmosphere. In Mary Pickford's film, A Romance of the Red Woods, the variations in this lighting within a single room are most interesting. Under a small, single source of light, the walls of the cabin and the faces of the actors are filled with staring shadows to match the terror of the episode enacted. Under ordinary clear studio lighting, the same scene takes on the cold grayness of the morning that follows. When comparative peace and security reign again, the cabin is warmed into mellow evening lamplight by the use of two or three brilliant sources of illumination.

Still further refinements of this matter of lighting come to me in this day at the movies. In the Thomas H. Ince production, Chicken Casey, as in virtually all his films, the possibilities of half illumination have been wonderfully realized by his art director, Robert Brunton. Light becomes atmosphere instead of illumination. Coming naturally from some window, lamp, or doorway, it illumines the center of the picture and the people standing there, with a glow that in intensity, in volume, or in variety of sources has some quality expressive of the emotion of the scene. Moreover, it illumines only the human figures and the things with which they are concerned. Behind them is a great, solid, realistic room, far more complete in every detail than any stage setting yet absolutely unobtrusive. In the ordinary screen production it is lit up within an inch of its life. Care is taken

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to make us see the sculptured reality of its every moulding, each sure-enough wrinkle of its hangings. The result, of course, is that we don't see the drama. The tawdry human figures jump about and distract us; that is all. In an Ince production all that massive detail fades into the dimness of shadowed corners. We know reality is there, rich reality, but we have something more important in hand. It is the human drama that Ince is presenting. He centers our attention on the one thing we need to understand, the people and the things they do and feel. There is something of Rembrandt in the Ince method.

Another type of production tries to do the same thing by a trick of the camera. It is well represented by The Americano, a film made by another and now departed element of the Triangle Film Corporation, the Fine Arts Studio, once dominated by Griffith. Here we watch the actors, too, and nothing but the actors. In a clear and mellow light, we see a man at his desk; behind him the details of his office fade off into the shadows of the theatre outside the screen. Out of the shadows steps Douglas Fairbanks, and into the spot of light where we have been watching the older man. The same general effect of concentration of acting and atmosphere is gained in almost all the other interior scenes of the film.

But it is gained, as you may observe, by hardly any genuine use of light. The margins of the picture outside the central portion given to the figures are masked in by an iris which makes a vignette of the center. As the background is always of dark wood or canvas, the effect is almost the same as in the Ince method; for the edge of the iris fades into the dark hue of the setting. The usefulness and necessity of a dark background are easily apparent by comparison with pictures where this iris effect is used in out-of-doors scenes, as in The Barrier. There the edge of the iris cuts sharply across the light sky or landscape. And the instant that line is visible, you not only become aware of the trick, but you grow camera-conscious. The mood of belief is lost; you are thinking of the director and the actors and the camera and all the make-believe, instead of feeling the story as a reality.

Aside from the fact that the Fine Arts method is a trick that keen observation can penetrate, it lacks pictorial virtues which the Ince enjoys. By the Ince method, the light is not only concentrated on the actors' figures; it may be composed in designs other than the rough circle of the iris. In the club scene from Chicken Casey, for instance, the light strikes across a group of men in evening dress from a tall window, throwing shadows that suggest in the angle and the lines of the panes the height and magnificence of the room. In the dramatist's library, the daylight is shaped and tempered by simple but handsome hangings at the windows. It enters his bedroom by both window and door, accomplishing the necessary job of illumination yet suggesting too the more Spartan arrangement of the room and the proximity of the library, from which the action flows.

Naturally, other directors have learned these tricks, and some use them extremely well. There is Alan Dwan, for instance, a keen-minded student of the screen since the early days. In Panthea he builds up amazingly effective prisons with nothing but inky shadows, and constructs a palatial dining room out of a great space of floor and table and a very large chandelier above. He knows how to control his light even in exteriors where he must depend on the sun. For this Russian photoplay he has built up Vermeer-like walls and shadowed commons that are full of the quality of Russian historical painters. His opening scene is as genuine a work of art as any composition by Steichen. Out of the darkness of the theatre comes a gray room, with three patches of photographic color. One is a small window high at the left. Under its light a young woman is just distinguishable above the corner of a grand piano. To the left is the door of a dimly lighted passage in which stands her old teacher. Then the camera picks out for us other features of this room, composed with the simplicity and dignity that reside in the piano itself. They are three men sitting apart from one another in the half light, listening. Music and the occasion—a private recital before connoisseurs—are the very breath of the scene.

But what is all this atmosphere alone? True, it is nothing unless it is spent on stories by a method that makes of them something filled with the completeness of life as our minds roam over it. And that the American movie has learned to do. It is our contribution. We have gone by experiment, by trial and error, by instinct, straight to the intricate, sub-mental nature of the photoplay which Münsterberg recognized in his valuable analytical volume. We throw on the screen in half a minute a dozen aspects, great and small, immediate and remote, obvious and inferential, actual and reminiscent, of the thing that is to be told.

It is a quality which resides first in the scenario and which the director must realize as he works. Alan Dwan, who makes his own scenarios, uses this thoroughgoing, Griffithian technique with sure effect in Panthea. He gathers that music room into our vision with undeniable sureness. He gives us Russia through a dozen small touches, crisp "flash backs," intimate and pungent "close-ups." When he gets to the swiftest part of his story, he drives

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

us through it unerringly and irresistibly by following physical actions to the minutest details. When, for instance, the police raid a dwelling, he shows not only the approach, the groups on both sides of the door, the violence of the entry and the scattering of the dwellers, but as the police charge upstairs after the hero, he smashes it home to us with a sudden flash of feet pounding the steps. Again he uses that same "close-up" expedient—and with an even greater, because characterizing, effect—when, after the officer has shot the hero, he kicks him over with his spurred boot to make sure he is harmless. Dwan catches in his "close-up" of the kicking boot not only the beastliness of the act, but a curve in the boot itself and in the direction of the blow which is amazingly characteristic of the hard, perky, Prussian-like little officer. Such a detail serves no purpose in the tale. Eliminate it and every necessary step of the action would be there. But, when not dwelt on at such lengths as to seem to have a plot importance which it lacks, such a means builds up conviction and atmosphere to an astounding degree. It is things of this sort—intuitions of writer and director—which will give photoplays some of the quality of observation and character that make literature.

Occasionally these technical means of light and of sequence and observation get themselves used in an episode that grows big with imagination. Such a moment occurs in the last photoplay of this blissful day, The Monster of Fate. It is a German film which, though using the Ince type of lighting with fine effect throughout, realizes the possibilities of the true movie technique only at rare moments when the story calls imperatively for this American-made device. One of these is unforgettable. The Monster is an old stone figure which comes to life when a scroll of magic has been inserted in a sort of hollow button on his chest. After many centuries of solitude in an abandoned well, the stone figure comes into the possession of an antiquarian who possesses also the secret of the scroll. He brings the stone giant to life and uses him for various picturesque purposes, including the guarding of a daughter who prefers to frisk with a young nobleman. The woman arouses the curiosity of the Monster, and ultimately a sort of passion, and when she escapes from the house, he follows her. Then comes the discovery of the world, still more wonderful than the finding of passion. The giant lumbers across the square of the German village staring at its gothic buildings. He reaches a brook and with a grin of amazed pleasure wades and splashes across. On the other side he finds a flowering bush. He takes a blossom in his great hand. Staring at it, he brings it close enough to his nose accidentally to smell the odor. Another of life's simplest and grandest things is caught on the broad, elementally stupid countenance of the creature. All, of course, in varied "long-shots" and "close-ups."

And now the best and most perfect moment, as we, and the camera, follow the Monster across country. We climb a slight rise of ground to a wooden crest. Out of that wood we stare, through a fine arts circle of shadowed boughs, towards a cathedral city, raising its spires to God. Suddenly, up from the foreground, rears the bulk of the Monster. His head is turned to gaze at the sight which, if it has arrested us, must strike him dumb. We watch with an amazingly personal interest. The body rises higher and higher, the head tilts back, the shoulders lift, the arms spread from the sides in a gesture of astounded wonder which encircles our vision of the miraculous city. Light and shadow, composition, selection and arrangement of pictures, drive home that miracle-laden pilgrimage of the Monster as few arts could do. Through them it realizes every quality of the imagination that word or paint can summon. It is the foreshadowing of such things in even the most commonplace of pictures that makes the routine of the movies in some degree a glorious venture.

KENNETH MACGOWAN.

Tu Quoque

OURS is a sincere doubt as to whether the question "And what did *you* do during the Great War?" might not embarrass, among others, God.

F. P. A.

Trivia

Lord Arden

"IF I were Lord Arden," said the Vicar, "I should shut up that great House; it's too big—what can a young unmarried man . . .?"

"If I were Lord Arden," said the Vicar's wife (and Mrs. La Mountain's tone showed how much she disapproved of that young nobleman), "if I were Lord Arden, I should live there, and do my duty to my tenants and neighbors."

"If I were Lord Arden," I said; but then it flashed vividly into my mind, suppose I really were this wicked young Lord? I quite forgot to whom I was talking; my memory was occupied with the names of people who had been famous for their enormous pleasures; who had filled their palaces with guilty revels, and built pyramids, obelisks, and half-acre Tombs, to soothe their Pride. My mind kindled at the thought of these old Audacities. "If I were Lord Arden!" I cried. . . .

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Human Ends

I REALLY was impressed, as we paced up and down the avenue, by the Vicar's words, and weighty, weighed advice. He spoke of the various professions; mentioned contemporaries of his own who had achieved success: how one had a seat in Parliament, would be given a seat in the Cabinet when his party next came in; another was a Bishop with a seat in the House of Lords; a third was a Barrister who was soon, it was said, to be raised to the Bench.

But in spite of my good intentions, my real wish to find, before it is too late, some career or other for myself (and the question is getting serious), I am far too much at the mercy of ludicrous images. Front seats, Episcopal, Judicial, Parliamentary Benches—and even the most exalted Thrones—are all the ends then, I asked myself, of serious, middle-aged ambition only things to sit on?

Under an Umbrella

FROM under the roof of my umbrella I saw the washed pavement lapsing beneath my feet, the news posters lying smeared with dirt at the crossings, the tracks of the 'buses in the liquid mud. On I went through this dreary world of wetness. And through how many rains and years shall I still hurry down wet streets—middle-aged, and then, perhaps, very old? And on what errands?

Asking myself these cheerless questions I fade from your vision, Reader, into the distance, sloping my umbrella against the wind.

L. PEARSALL SMITH.

CORRESPONDENCE

Supremacy of the State

SIR: Will you allow me to break a lance with Mr. Walter Lippmann on the subject of his article entitled A Clue in your issue of April 14th, as it deals with a question which, though it may seem academic, is really I think of vital importance for right thinking at the present crisis.

What Mr. Lippmann discusses in his article is really at bottom the familiar problem (not by any means a purely American problem) of hyphenation: of the conflicting claims of the trade union, nationality, and other forms of social grouping upon the allegiance of the citizen of a modern community. As he truly says, all these associations tend "rigorously to insist on unqualified allegiance" and he admits that they are justified in doing so by the psychological fact that "a divided will is likely to be an ineffective one."

How does Mr. Lippmann meet the difficulty, a difficulty which has been torturing the minds of hundreds and thousands of conscientious people in Europe and America during the last three years? He meets it by calmly saying that "the dilemmas themselves have to be abolished and forms of coöperative allegiance devised," though, as he naïvely admits in the next sentence, "we have as yet only the very vaguest notions how this is to be done." And he ends by telling us that the new "great central idea" which is to control our thinking during the next generation is "the search for the ways and means towards new and more workable varieties of federalism."

I am disposed to agree with Mr. Lippmann that the study of federalism is the most important practical political problem before us in the coming years. It is certainly coming to be so regarded in the British Commonwealth—in the old country, in the Dominions and in India. But it is a perversion of the meaning of the word federalism to represent it as involving a competition between the claims of the political state and those of other social groups. There are isolated thinkers in numerous camps, from Mr. Laski (whose book I have unfortunately not read) to Mr. Bertrand Russell and Baron von Hügel, who are preaching Mr. Lippmann's doctrine of the divided allegiance, but they are really not federalists but syndicalists. The main stream of the world's thought, from Aristotle to President Wilson, has, however, held fast to what Mr. Lippman calls the "archaic" view that the political allegiance takes precedence of all others because it embraces the common concerns of the whole community. The traditional doctrine is enshrined in the word republic and its English translation commonwealth, just as the most conscious and logical exponents of the opposite view describe themselves as Syndicalists, from the French word for Trade Union.

One of the surprises of the war has been its refutation of syndicalism and its demonstration of the hold of the political state on the loyalty of the average man. This has been true of all the European belligerent countries with the possible exception of Austria-Hungary. It is fashionable, I know, to set this loyalty down to war-fever or to unthinking "nationalism": but in reality it is a striking testimony to men's sense of the value of statehood and of the social stability which its existence ensures. The claim of the individual conscience is, of course, indefeasible; but the average man feels, if he does not know, that a state in which the majority of the citizens, or even a substantial minority, doubted to which external authority their supreme allegiance was due would soon cease to be a state at all. Still more compelling is the citizen's obligation when his state is not an autocracy but a commonwealth based on the idea of the welfare of all its members. It is of the very essence of a commonwealth that it should be able to call upon its members, in President Wilson's words, to dedicate all they have and are for the cause of which it exists—the cause of free government and the moral progress of humanity.

For I do not agree with Mr. Lippmann that the working out of the federal idea (whether in his sense or mine) is going to be the great central idea of the coming years. That is a very mechanical and superficial view of the task of world-reconstruction with which we are faced. I think we need to look deeper. The "great central idea" which should inspire us is surely that enunciated by President Wilson when in his address to Congress he said, in the spirit of Plato's philosophic king, "*we are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and responsibility for wrong done*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shall be observed among nations and their Governments that are observed among individual citizens of civilized States."

The task of *moralizing* the policy of states, whether in their attitude towards their own citizens or towards other states, is one of immense difficulty. It is likely to tax all that there is of virtue in every part of the body politic. That is why it is necessary to reëmphasize what must, to Americans at any rate, be the old platitudes of dedication as against the insidious syndicalism to which Mr. Lippmann seems in danger of falling a victim. Those who are preaching the doctrine of the divided allegiance are weakening the sense of civic obligation and responsibility at a moment when it is more necessary than ever that it should be firm and clear. The best way in which a modern man can serve the cause of liberty, peace and justice in the world whether at home or abroad is by helping to make the policy of his own state stand for righteousness. The League of Honor to which we look forward is not an association of individuals drawn from different countries or even an association of national groups (though both these things are good and necessary) but an association of democratic states. The way to world peace lies through the comity of free states or commonwealths, who do unto others as they would others should do unto them. But to the extent to which a commonwealth is unable to rely on the undivided loyalty of its citizens it is weakened as an effective instrument of moral and political progress. It is a strange thing that the people who have the word internationalism most frequently on their lips have been in this country, at any rate, the people who have done most to divide and confuse the sense of the individual citizen's obligation towards the state of which he is a member and so to endanger the very cause they have at heart.

Amid a wilderness of arid German writing, which I have lately had occasion to read, I came across the following sentence the other day in an essay by the well known German theologian Dr. Troeltsch, paraphrasing the well-known passage in one of St. Paul's Epistles, "Now, therefore, there abide these three, individual morality, state morality, and cosmopolitan morality, *but the greatest and most important of these at the present time is state morality.*" As a concession to Mr. Lippmann I would add to these three a fourth—group morality. But the main thought of the passage seems to me to be sound, far sounder, in spite of the country of its origin, than Mr. Lippmann's vague and disruptive ideas of coöperative allegiance. I will add another sentence which I have just read in an Austrian Jewish publication—though it makes ill reading in a professedly Christian country. "It is because the Christian peoples have not been able to set their mutual relations upon the ethical basis of their religion that national egoism has exercised unrestricted sway over international relations and 'patriotism,' in the sense given it by Bismarck and his disciples, has enjoyed unquestioned moral justification." Let us first clear this reproach out of the way before we disperse our energies and divide our forces according to Mr. Lippmann's prescription.

ALFRED E. ZIMMERN.

London.

[NOTE: Where Mr. Zimmern seems to have missed the point of Mr. Lippmann's argument is in his analysis of the actual structure of modern life. Mr. Lippmann urged the need of a coöperative allegiance, because it had become obvious as a simple fact that the state had ceased to enjoy possession of the exclusive loyalties of men. Mr. Zimmern merely retorts that this ought not to be so; and he urges that only through the state can social satisfaction be ultimately obtained.

But he seems to have disregarded certain fundamental facts.

(a) The British trade-union movement has acquiesced in the predominance of the state simply because, in this crisis, state and nation have become identified. There is no evidence that this condition will persist after the war and the recent labor unrest suggests that the present peace is only a truce and not a final settlement.

(b) It is doubtful whether the average man ever considers the effect of dissent from the state. But it is in any case clear that where first principles are concerned he will not hesitate as in the case of Sinn Fein and Ulster, to dissent vehemently from its conclusions.

(c) Mr. Lippmann would not doubt the right of the state to call out its members for such causes as that of free government. But what of cases where that element of moral right, as in the South African war, is only doubtfully involved? Can Mr. Zimmern question that men will act upon the evidence of their own conscience, and that it is right that they should so act?

(d) It seems to matter little by what name we call Mr. Lippmann's plea. But the real point is that the increasing complexity of modern society renders it more and more evident that the business of government has to be distributed over a vast area of groups. What Mr. Lippmann pleaded for was simply the recognition of this fact.

(e) No one disagrees with Mr. Zimmern that the problem of the future is to moralize state action, internally and externally. The whole point is by what means that is to be achieved. He suggests that only through the personal influence of the citizen on the state can such moralization be made effective. But precisely because that argument neglects the fundamental fact that political power is, as Lord Acton said, the handmaid of economic power, Mr. Lippmann urged that the best means is to make the state compete for the affection of its citizens by the superior claims of its moral program. We doubt if Mr. Zimmern realizes how momentary the high moral purpose of the English state is to vast numbers of its members. It is highly questionable whether they will feel that politics, in the pre-war sense of the term, will be the best means of achieving the validation of its purpose in the period of reconstruction. Mr. Zimmern does; but the only argument he adduces is his belief that to preach a divided allegiance is to weaken the sense of civic obligation. But that, in fact, is to do no more than to assert that the state cannot stand the competition of other groups. Mr. Zimmern ought surely to examine into its causes. Mr. Lippmann implied that the reason of its inadequacy is that the great society needs new machinery for its effective operation. The old conception of the state which we inherited from 1789 has proved inadequate. It has been less a nationalist state than a middle class institution which has survived by the concessions it has made from time to time to the working-classes. But, internally, the real task is the achievement of industrial democracy. Mr. Zimmern will pardon many of us for doubting if that can be achieved most effectively through the ordinary state.

(f) It is not a perversion of federalism to use it as meaning a division of power between the state and groups. Whether we call this federalism, or syndicalism, or guild-socialism, or coöperative sovereignty, the fact remains that it is an accurate picture of tendencies the war has served only to make more profound. Mr. Zimmern feels that man

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has developed a fuller sense of statehood during the war. But that is due to his acceptance of its temporary moral purpose. Mr. Lippmann urged that the best guaranty of its continuance is the erection of a system of supplementary allegiances whereby state and groups may strive, diversely in method, but similarly in purpose to the common good. Mr. Zimmern does not believe that the present perspective of the state-loyalty of men will change; but it is permissible to see differently.

(g) Lastly, it may be suggested that the actual history of the matter goes to support Mr. Lippmann's conclusions. In Mr. Laski's book, of which he spoke, it was shown that in certain fundamental events of the nineteenth century loyalty was always federal and that good resulted therefrom. The same could be shown of almost any similar controversies. The Catholic reaction in France presented exactly the same issue to the statesmen of the Third Republic. The problem to-day in Quebec is in nowise dissimilar. Nor can a movement that has had the intellectual support of men like Maitland and Figgis and Duguit be called isolated. They stood for a federalism in ideas. It is essentially the disappearance of that spiritual federalism from Germany through the domination of its machinery by Prussia which is responsible for the widespread and regrettable acceptance of so wrong a cause as hers. Mr. Lippmann is really asking for no more than the political implications of freedom of belief and of criticism—rights which tend to disappear where loyalty is unitary. He is suggesting that we have no facts to support Mr. Zimmern's assumption that the state is the final device of social grouping. We cannot see that Mr. Zimmern has really undermined that basic thesis.—THE EDITORS.]

Comment from Holland

SIR: Dr. B. DeJong von Beck on Donk, an eminent jurist in Holland, Secretary of the "Organization Centrale pour la Paix Durable," received from a friend in New York, under date of May 10th, a letter containing the following words:

"We rather expect in this country that the war will be prolonged on account of the United States entering, because I suppose now the Allies will want to have a peace *with victory,* whereas, if we had not come in, there might have been something resembling a draw. Do not let Europe misunderstand.

"The American people will go into this war as heavily as France and England and if it should happen that the Allies are temporarily beaten, we would not stop fighting, I believe, until we had put eighteen or twenty million men in the field. The American people are slow to wrath, but when they go in, they have always in the past 'seen it through' and they will do so this time.

"Let us pray, however, for a speedy peace somehow and some way."

The following is quoted from the reply of the Dutch jurist, written before the Pope's peace offer and Mr. Wilson's reply:

"I was greatly interested to read what you said about the probable prolongation of the war on account of the United States having entered and thank you for warning us that Europe is not to underrate the strength of America. We are fully aware of the fact and have tried to bring it to the knowledge of our friends in Germany for we thought it useful that the Germans should know it also. Nevertheless, it would seem to me regrettable if the Allies were now indeed strengthened in their determination not to give up fighting until the longed-for 'peace with victory' is achieved. Already we, objective neutrals, have been sadly impressed by the contents of President Wilson's note to the Russian government and of his last speech. [The Flag Day speech.] We wonder how a man who, with so much talent and pure feeling, set forth the necessity of peace without victory on January 22nd, can suddenly have acquired such different views. It has been a great disappointment to the democratic friends of a durable peace. We have been able to understand Mr. Wilson's declaration of war, and have been annoyed by the German papers which at that moment suddenly started offending and attacking the President. We understand his reasons so well that to a certain extent we admired him for having declared war. For we hoped that Mr. Wilson, holding it necessary to spend all American strength in order to destroy the victory of the German military party and by forcing the Germans to accept his peace program, which was the program for all true pacifists, would nevertheless be proud and strong enough to remain the great impartial who would, in an unprejudiced way, judge the demands of the European belligerents and adapt them in accordance with the welfare of the world at large. We had hoped and trusted that it would be possible for Wilson, the philosopher, to act in such a fashion and to enable the good specimens amongst the German nation to continue to regard Wilson, "the enemy," as their spiritual leader. Instead of all this, the President now "cries with the wolves" and utters commonplace war phrases, used by every belligerent in an almost mechanical manner so that not even the moderate Germans can support him any longer. This has been a real defeat for the 'Wilson-party' in Germany and has decreased their influence considerably whilst it has encouraged autocracy and militarism. His attitude is most deplorable indeed. I know that the greater part of neutral Europe shares my views on this subject, even those whose sympathies are on the side of the Entente.

"Germany will not be beaten militarily for several years to come and a revolution in Germany is not to be expected so long as the Entente Powers insist in their present arrogance. President Wilson is sure to know this as well as anybody. And yet he thinks that a prolongation of this world-misery for many years is to be preferred to an early peace which might be called forth if the governments of the Entente, by using moderate language, induced the numerous moderate elements in Germany to compel their government to make peace-proposals in accordance with President Wilson's speech in the Senate.

"I hope that you will think it fit to have this opinion on Mr. Wilson's procedure, which prevails in the circles of his most enthusiastic admirers, spread amongst your friends."

X. X. X.

In Brief

SIR: Your attitude might be phrased thus: The more peace-talk we suppress, the more united and desperate must the Germans become; the more peace-talk we permit, the readier will the Germans grow to talk peace with us on terms we can accept.

All sensible men must endorse that attitude.

SAMUEL A. ELIOT, JR.

Pittsfield, Massachusetts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Different Galsworthy

Beyond, by John Galsworthy. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. $1.50.

BETWEEN good novels and poor ones there is something of the difference that marks a mountain honestly climbed and a mountain ascended by the funicular. There is nothing criminal about using the funicular, if you happen to care for that sort of thing, but it isn't mountain climbing. It isn't mountain climbing any more than a massage is a gallop or canned music the same as music between man and man.

So, if you care for novel-reading as a diversion, there is no reason why Beyond should be damned to you. As a funicular-novel, a means of getting from the depths to the heights on-the-cheap, it is one of the best of the season. But as a Galsworthy performance, a novel out of the man who wrote The Island Pharisees and Fraternity and Strife and Justice and The Mob and A Commentary and The Silver Box, it is one of the most extraordinary bits of degeneracy, literary degeneracy, that was ever exposed. It is more facile than his other stories. It is quick and neat and fluent. It is dramatic. But its texture shows a complacency and flabbiness so amazing that one who sees the dedication to Thomas Hardy is inclined to look the other way.

The word degeneracy is a loose one to describe that change in personality which one inevitably infers from Beyond. It is not so much that the earlier Mr. Galsworthy has disintegrated as that he has in some strange manner become eclipsed. If it were a case of disintegration, one might be able to trace in the present performance the blurred and muddled outlines of the old. It would take a subtle person to detect in Beyond the author of The Island Pharisees. Perhaps in The Dark Flower there was the continuance of a transition that was unpleasantly incipient in The Patrician. One who has not read The Dark Flower has no right to say. But it is almost as if a new personality emerged in Beyond, so completely emancipated from the deference to reality which distinguished the earlier books that Robert W. Chambers is like the present Mr. Galsworthy's rakish brother, with Mrs. Humphrey Ward a somewhat older and decidedly Episcopalian sister. The same blood, so to speak, flows in the novels of the three of them—icily in Mrs. Ward, brightly and snappily in Mr. Chambers, warmly and richly in Mr. Galsworthy. He turns out poor novels all the better for having written real ones, as an impresario who once was a practised preacher is likely to do exceedingly well.

The fundamental change in Beyond is a change of altitude. In the earlier Mr. Galsworthy there was never a sense of mastery of life, but there was a peculiar distinction and beauty in the values against which his characters came to be set. He did not obtrude on his characters, any more than Turgeniev, but he allowed an essence of his own rather suppressed and saddened reflection to tinge the horizons against which men and women appeared. A nimbus surrounded every one he pictured, a nimbus of something genuine and exquisite and considerate, and in that medium many who were suffocated by the strong assumptions of the contemporary successful Pharisee breathed deeply and purely, and were grateful. At such an altitude as Mr. Galsworthy's the air did not encourage rank luxuriousness, but whatever survived had a special fineness and hardiness. He was one of a few.

In Beyond, the perceptive distance between portrayed and portrayer has vanished. There is no longer an observant artist who besides revealing a world in operation never fails to suggest its significance. There is only an uncritical and conventional narrator who has adopted with apparent equanimity the hackneyed estimates of men and women that enable the game of popular fiction to be played. Perhaps as a human being Mr. Galsworthy has arrived at a new conception of life, coinciding with the hackneyed, or perhaps, as sometimes happens to a boy who could sing, he has actually outgrown his talent. Whichever is the case, Beyond is the evidence in it, incriminating in the eyes of any but the helplessly indulgent.

It is not in the plot that Mr. Galsworthy shows his duality of nature, but in the absurd platitudes that besprinkle his pages and in the larger platitudes of psychology that permit him to offer puppets as men and women. To say that a man has created puppets is scarcely more than an epithet. It is a book reviewer's equivalent to a teamster's more candid expression of ill-will. So is the accusation of platitude. But it is almost enough to quote a dozen tags of reflection and characterization to indicate the new Mr. Galsworthy who is being abused.

As a preliminary it is necessary to say to say that Mr. Galsworthy is dealing with a type of woman who loves "beyond measure—beyond death," and yet who won't go through the divorce court to make a social place for her love. The mother of Gyp is married to a squire. Gyp's father is a narrow, reticent, trim gentleman of the old school who, when Gyp's mother dies in childbirth, never glances at another woman as long as he lives. Gyp, the child of this liaison, is the heroine. Much against her dear father's judgment she marries a green-eyed Swedish violinist when she is barely out of her teens. He is a "foreigner" in the eyes of the father, and is really a foreigner in the sense that his code about women is not English, not wholesome. There is almost Pharisaism in Mr. Galsworthy's sense of the Swede's unwholesomeness. Within a year, at any rate, he is a beast, unfaithful to this clean-cut, well-bred, proud English girl. She stands him until his drunken fury imperils her child. Her separation is a return to her hunting life and English ways, and in those ways she meets, at last, an Englishman whose sunny wholesomeness awakens in her the desire to give beyond measure the love that she did not know existed for her. But her quick acceptance of her lover leads her to think it uncandid to divorce her husband, and he won't divorce her. Thus she has to live a secret love. The effect of this on her character is an absorptiveness which the sunny Englishman cannot meet, love her though he does. But about the time that their relation comes to maladjustment an accident smashes the man and the story.

It might be a great story, but here are tags of the new Galsworthy-Cosmopolitan Magazine manner: "The happiest time of a girl's life is that when all appreciate and covet her, and she herself is free as air—a queen of hearts, for none of which she hankers; or, if not the happiest, at all events it is the gayest time." "She was, so far again as breeding would allow, something of a humanitarian and rebel, loving horses and dogs, and hating cats, except when they had four legs." "Disillusionment is not welcome to a woman's heart; the less welcome when it is disillusionment with self as much as with another." "And soon after Daphne Wing departed, full of sugar-plums and hope." "Though among his acquaintances Summerhay always provoked badinage, in which he was scarcely ever defeated, yet in chambers and court, on circuit, at his club, in society or the hunting-field, he had an unfavorable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

effect on the grosser sort of stories. There are men—by no means striking moral—who exercise this blighting influence. They are generally what the French call 'spirituel,' and often have rather desperate love-affairs which they keep very closely to themselves." "The curious and complicated nature of man in matters of the heart is not sufficiently conceded by woman, professors, clergymen, judges, and other critics of his conduct. And naturally so, since they all have vested interests in his simplicity. Even journalists are in the conspiracy to make him out less wayward than he is, and dip their pens in epithets, if his heart diverges inch or ell." "Astounding how much can be talked of in two or three hours of a railway journey!"

One who recalls the tone of the earlier novels will not need to have these genial banalities insisted upon. They leap out as incongruities in a Galsworthy text. It is as if Mr. Galsworthy had said, "Yes, I am a careful and serious artist but I'm tired draining my veins into my stories. Why should all my popular brethren be allowed to write without keeping their eye on life while I have to agonize and be intensive? I'll cut loose. I'll be as flashy and as lively as the rest of them. I'll stop being a prig." It is as if he had said this, and not dreamed for a moment of the consequences on those who, recognizing his narrow intensiveness, had appreciated the fine result as a treasure beyond price. Of course the popular method is more immediately effective—the romanticism of laconic men, sinister foreigners, proud and yet unremitting women. But the suavity of Mr. Galsworthy's triteness is an injury to a faith. He is an artist in his sphere, and his lesion is lamentable. Some men could let themselves go, like Mr. Arnold Bennett, and do nothing to impair their personality—reposing, as it does, on other grounds. But Mr. Galsworthy without his personality is an invertebrate, and this is the tragedy of Beyond.

F. H.

Authority and Freedom

Europe Unbound, by L. March Phillips. New York: Charles Scribners' Sons. $1.75.

THAT Mr. Phillips would write a valuable book no one who had read his Works of Man could have much doubt. He has essentially a distinguished mind, the faculty of seeing beyond the merely repulsive surface aspects of his problem to the deeper issues that are involved. Of the general accuracy of his interpretation there can hardly, in any broad sense, be serious question. When the philosophic aspect of his attitude is considered its general truth is even more apparent. Written, moreover, in a singularly graceful style, with a happy turn for the right phrase and the just word, there have been few English books on the nature of this war which are so deserving of serious attention.

The fundamental thesis Mr. Phillips lays down is his belief that this war is a conflict between authority and liberty. So boldly stated, the argument is, of course, too simple to be true and Mr. Phillips proceeds to set it in the background of facts. By "authority" he means the general tendency for government to act without regard for the rights of personality; by "liberty" he means a political system in which a due reconciliation is sought between social demand and private development. The first system is, he urges, that which, traditionally, has been the characteristic policy of Prussia; the second is the main thread from which a reasonably accurate philosophy of English history may be evolved. That does not mean, as he rightly emphasizes, that there has not been liberty in Prussia, or that Englishmen have been entirely free from the taint of excessive authoritarianism. What it means is that on the whole it is a reasonable interpretation of Prussian history to suggest that liberty is there exceptional, and of English history that the search for its amplification is in accord with the real and continuous effort that has been made.

On the whole, I think that an impartial observer would be inclined to admit the truth of this argument. With some of its corollaries he might have more serious trouble. He would be, I believe, anxious to insist that freedom is too broad a category to stand without further analysis. He would admit that in English history there has been a continuous and conscious growth of political and religious freedom; if he were at all truthful he would be inclined to deny that the impulse of economic freedom can there be at all justifiably discovered. Anyone, for example, who reads Mr. Tawney's account of the Agrarian revolution of the sixteenth century, or considers the analysis that is being slowly but finely elaborated by Mr. and Mrs. Hammond of the fruits of the Industrial Revolution, will hardly doubt that to talk here of freedom is simply beside the point. Moreover, if he were honest, he would have to admit that the result of the freedom so gained has not been unduly large. It is clear, for instance, that the result of the three great reform movements of the nineteenth century contributed far less to a genuine political emancipation than might have been hoped. Education has not proved the panacea that was expected. The general dissatisfaction with representative government has a sinister import not to be denied. Few who genuinely care for liberty can have hailed with any intimate satisfaction things like the accession of Lord Milner and Lord Curzon to high political office. That the Defense of the Realm Act should imply such broad powers as the House of Lords admitted to the Zadig case cannot help but prick the conscience of those who are moved even by the appearance of general currents in the tide. A war for liberty ought not, to be logical, to involve the prosecution of Mr. Bertrand Russell and the suppression of the London Nation. In a war for liberty, ideas, at least, should be wholly free.

Still the broad fact remains that the atmosphere of English life permits, more fully than in Germany, the expansion of personality. The precious virtues of individualism, the realization that each of us is himself a conscience not to be absorbed in the great conscience of the state, preserve the broad basis of freedom. When Mr. Phillips urges that this is true also of France and of the Balkans I think he is less happy. The contribution of France to the history of Europe is less the love of liberty than of equality. I should agree that they are complimentary; just as I should agree that Englishmen, as a whole, have still to appreciate the significance of egalitarianism. The English, as Bagehot consolingly remarked, are still a deferential people; and the recent bye-election at Liverpool suggests that they still prefer the idealist glamor of an immature peer to the sober realism of a hard-headed workingman. In such an attitude it is difficult to gather the full fruit of liberal doctrine. In France the desire for freedom seems almost to have been satisfied where the oppression has fallen equally upon all. It is only in the few years since the Dreyfus case that it is possible to detect any full signs of change. Indeed, even so acute an observer as Mr. Faguet, himself a liberal in outlook, was insistent that France has no aptitude for liberalism. It is, in this connection, worthy the remark that the contribution of the Revolution to European history has not yet been adequately assessed in matter of loss and gain.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

M. Aulard has shown us the colossal deficiencies of Taine's historical equipment; but the emphasis which the latter gave to the interpretation of the Revolution has written its mark deeply. Syndicalist and royalist alike combine to reject the France of the Revolution as a thoroughly bourgeois creation. That they go too far in their criticism does not conceal the fact that there is inherent in it a truth upon which some emphasis should be laid. Nor is Mr. Phillips happier when he insists on the natural love of the Balkan states for freedom. I cannot avoid the observation that we know far too little about the Balkans to lay down such large generalizations. One day, indeed, the patient labors of Mr. Jorga may give some inspired successor of Lord Acton the materials for his judgment; but because the Balkans struggled to throw off the Turkish yoke one hesitates to call them free. I imagine that those who, like Mr. Nevinson and Miss Durham, know them at all intimately would tell a very different story.

Where I think Mr. Phillips is profoundly right is in his vigorous insistence on the authoritarian character of the German state and its dangers to the liberty of Europe. We badly need a book that would point out exactly what principles are involved in the exercise of political authority. Perhaps, some day, Mr. Graham Wallas will give us that, and will tell us something of the psychological influence that is exerted by power on those who wield it. My own purely provisional conclusions would be that there is in fact no real safeguard for liberty except in the genuine division, not of powers, but of power; that is to say that with all the difficulties of administration it involves there is a more genuine security in a federal than in an unitary state. Now the real difficulty with Germany is that despite the appearance of federalism, it is only in the execution of principles and not in their promulgation, that the federalism is at all real. For all the fundamental purposes of government power is concentrated at a single center; and how that power can be used when it is allied to ignoble ambition the long history of Prussian dishonesty bears witness. It is singularly interesting in this regard that the real reaction against state-infallibility during the nineteenth century has come in no real sense from Germany. The great German philosophers, Hegel, Fichte, Stahl, have all been rigidly authoritarian in outlook. The ablest of recent political thinkers, in Germany, Jellinek, Laband and Otto Mayer, have all preached a theory of a state limited only by its own will—the famous doctrine of auto-limitation—which while it kicks infallibility down the front stairs, holds the back door invitingly open. Even Gierke, the greatest apostle of corporate personality, manages somehow to exclude the state from the logic of his philosophy. The result of such an outlook is written large in the history of the past three years.

It is difficult to avoid a real uncertainty when Mr. Phillips insists upon the fundamental connections between liberty and Christianity. If Christianity be interpreted as a spirit, there is doubtless much to be said for the argument. But the influence of a spirit is in most cases too impalpable to make an estimate of its contribution more than a varyingly plausible hypothesis. And to the possible contribution of the Christian spirit there must be placed the counterbalancing harm of the Christian churches. Whether it be the resolute medievalism of Rome, the social antiquarianism of the Anglican Church, the gloomy interpretations of nonconformity, it is difficult to deny that the value of their spirit has in every case been destroyed when they have given themselves material form. As a protest against state-absorptiveness they have had their value as they still possess it. But to the degree in which they have been the embodiment of the clericalist spirit they have been the allies not of liberty but of the authoritarian spirit.

Nothing is more valuable in Mr. Phillips's book than his analysis of the conditions of party-warfare before the outbreak of the war. The picture he paints of a stagnation and a gloomy discontent, a decadence of ideals, a sacrifice of principle to the spirit of the party-machine, is singularly like the aspect of American politics. If the war, as he says, has demonstrated one thing with certainty, it is that no political system can for long be adequate in which the internal divisions of party fail to correspond to a living difference of principle. Wherein exactly the new orientation will come, it is of course difficult to prophesy. It is to be hoped, indeed, that Mr. Brailsford is right and that it is upon the future of labor that the issue will be joined. In America, as yet, the war has not attended to this problem; and the gust of the progressive storm has passed with but little change. Yet the result of the whole epoch, both in England and America, begins to emerge with tolerable clarity. It is, as Mr. Phillips insists, as certain as, in the nature of things, there can be certainty in political life, that improvement is born from the clash of order and of change. The natural inertia of men sends the current of social protoplasm to defend the standard that is attacked, and liberty demands its eradication. We, assuredly, have no natural right to optimism. Progress is a dodge that plays its tricks like miracles and is utterly without reliability. But the glamor that attaches to the idea of freedom we cannot now mistake; and if the energies of men are adequately enlisted in the conflict ours may well prove an epic time.

H. J. L.

Excellent and Imperfect

The Birth Time of the World and Other Scientific Essays, by J. Joly, M.A., Sc.D., F.R.S. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. $3.50.

NONE but Swift or Gilbert could find a rhyme for "hippopotamus," and it takes Professor Joly to write popular essays on pleochroic haloes and coefficients of friction. As a matter of fact, few if any of the papers and addresses collected in this volume represent what is currently labeled "popular science." Here and there Professor Joly advances towards his audience with mincing and uncertain tread, doling out perchance a definition of "calorie' where terms far more recondite pass unexplained. But he is not frequently beguiled into such paternal solicitude for the layman's comfort. His pages bristle with diagrams and tables of figures, though these are tempered with beautiful photographs of Alpine landscapes; there is close reasoning that taxes the layman's attention to the utmost; and throughout some knowledge is assumed of the several sciences, by no means few in number, that an up-to-date geologist must master. In short, the reader's appetite is not cloyed with honeyed pills of knowledge. Yet there are snatches everyone can enjoy. As an ardent admirer of beautiful scenery, and with a gift for expression, Professor Joly is not infrequently moved to real eloquence; and in lighter mood he entertains us with such delicious news as that Klopstock, dreariest of poets, was of all people the one to make skating a popular sport in the Fatherland.

It is a great pity that Professor Joly's audience must remain a small one. For he is by no means a narrow specialist but an original investigator of high rank, an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

independent thinker capable of coördinating facts from seemingly remote branches of knowledge and not afraid to let his imagination roam untrodden fields. Whether he outlines a new method for estimating the age of the earth, or criticises Lowell's theory of Mars as the abode of intelligent beings, or speculates on the possibility of a universe without gravitational attraction, he always has some novel view to expound, sometimes one of striking originality and suggestiveness.

Other Minds than Ours? is perhaps the masterpiece of the series, quite regardless of its acceptability to astronomers so far as its positive contribution is concerned. After a wonderfully lucid picture of the problem raised by Lowell regarding the Martian canals, it develops the hypothesis that the lines were the physical effect of the passage of minor satellites some time before they were pulled into the planet. This eliminates, of course, as unnecessary any assumption of intelligent activity on Mars to account for the canals. Skating, though less original, represents a very high type of popular lecture. It culminates in the exposition of the far from generally known fact that we skate not on ice but on water; the pressure exerted lowers the melting point below that of the surrounding ice, and accordingly the surface covered by the blade of the skate melts to be re-solidified as soon as the skate passes on. Incidentally, the interesting point is made that, without the slightest theoretical knowledge of the principle involved, the inventors of the skate have unconsciously evolved the contrivance most perfectly adapted to the skater's ends. The essay that gives its title to the book is also of more general interest, though the conclusions as to the age of the earth remain disappointingly indefinite in the face of the strange disparity between results from geological and radio-active evidence. It is perhaps worth noting that while a generation ago geologists protested against Lord Kelvin's niggardly time estimate from physical considerations as inadequate for the evolution of the organic kingdoms, it is now the physical calculations that suggest a higher order of antiquity.

In several other papers the principles of radio-activity are applied to problems of practical or theoretic moment; indeed, they form one of the very few and very slender threads that knit together many of the otherwise quite disconnected essays.

This lack of unity is one of the serious defects of the volume. Professor Joly doubtless knew exactly what he was about in collecting with little or no modification a dozen papers contributed to various publications from 1890 until the most recent years. But it is really too bad that a writer so brilliantly equipped to act as an interpreter of Science, and to vindicate her ways to the laity, should allow an opportunity to slip by for wider effectiveness. Even with the present choice of topics a little unbending of the original purpose, a little rewriting here and there, sometimes even a trifling change in order, would have helped wonderfully. Why, for example, is the rather elementary exposition of radio-active principles in The Use of Radium in Medicine relegated to a place near the end when preceding papers plunge the reader into the midst of the same subject, with little or no life-preserving explanation? Besides this greater integration we might also have wished to see some attempt to bring the earlier articles up-to-date. After all, much has happened since the early nineties, and while we may be fascinated by speculations as to a pre-material universe that take the Kant-Laplacean hypothesis for a point of departure, we also want them developed with the more recent planetesimal theory for a basis.

One criticism as to form is of a more important character. It is not generally understood that scientific exposition has its aesthetic side and that its canons from this point of view are the canons of the stage. The problem is set, the problem is unfolded, obstacles are met and overcome until the final Q. E. D. resolves the breathlessly waiting spectator's hopes and fears and ushers in the curtain. This, doubtless, is what Boltzmann, himself a physicist of the highest rank and endowed with singularly keen artistic sensibilities, meant when he spoke of the dramatic intensity of Clerk Maxwell's demonstrations. Those who have followed Galileo's discovery of the velocity of falling bodies, or Castle's experiments with transplanted ovaries of guinea-pigs, or Pfeffer's determination of the one chemical substance among a seemingly hopeless multitude that causes female algae to attract the spores of the male plants, will know what is meant. Professor Joly, as already hinted, is a man of fine aesthetic feeling, but this peculiarly dramatic quality seems foreign to his make-up, or at least to his writing. Despite a total absence of verbosity, there is frequently something floundering and dawdling about his exposition that suggests the limitless breadth of a German novel rather than the pithy concentration of the short-story or play. Also there is little sense for a fitting conclusion, and as a rule the climax of the argument, where there is one, is well past when the curtain is rung down.

If these formal deficiencies are strongly insisted on, it is not for the purpose of deterring readers from grappling with Professor Joly's book, but because it is galling to see excellence so narrowly miss perfection. His breadth of knowledge and freshness of outlook must prove instructive and stimulating to every serious student.

R. H. L.

TIFFANY & CO.

SILVER, SUBSTANTIAL IN WEIGHT

FIFTH AVENUE AND 37TH STREET
NEW YORK

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Recent Publications

The Banks of Colne, by Eden Phillpotts. New York: The Macmillan Co. $1.50.

MR. PHILLPOTTS here writes in the studiedly quiet and somewhat aloof vein which has been the characteristic literary method of all his later novels. It is a novel of maturity and even tone. The flower nurseries of Colchester and some near-by oyster fisheries are the setting for the story; and they furnish the occasion for those lavish descriptions of the color and technique of picturesque industries which Mr. Phillpotts has always liked to vivify and record. The framework is rich, gorgeous even, yet the author is far too competent a craftsman to permit it to sag or become topheavy. The adjectives are not intrusive decorations, although it is Mr. Phillpotts' genius to paint his picture in meticulous little exact strokes, something resembling the "spots of light" method of the neo-impressionists, instead of in broader and more generously imaginative sweeps of the brush. But the pictures do spring from a genuine and affectionate observation, forming a luxurious background that is still veracious and quick. Against this appealing background the human drama moves a trifle slowly, if steadily and cumulatively to its pre-determined end. Like many of Mr. Phillpotts' conclusions, the end just escapes melodrama. A vagabond brother who hates his successful and smug and prosperous relative murders his brother's employee, after tricking him into thinking that any injury to his master is a favor to the renegade. As it happens, the favor was the seduction of his brother's silly, sensuous wife. Interwoven, is the history of a pseudo-widow, an artist, who marries without daring to let her lover know that her first husband, a prig of rectitude, still lives. When he discovers the truth, he goes off to the wars and is killed. Except as this instrument for extricating his protagonist from a situation too difficult to carry to a normal rather than a cataclysmic finish, the war does not obtrude. It is hardly even a dark background. Mr. Phillpotts has an extraordinary ability to focus on the permanent flow of life which continues irrespective even of world calamities. Dotted throughout the book are minor character sketches of charm and great good-humor. In fact, nearly all the elements of insight and verbal power and story-telling ability that are distinctive of Mr. Phillpotts are fused in The Banks of Colne. For all who enjoy Mr. Phillpotts' old-fashioned "objective" method, the method of the craftsman of record and observation, The Banks of Colne must furnish many hours of quiet satisfaction.

Second Wind, by Freeman Tilden. New York: B. W. Huebsch. $1.00.

MR. TILDEN calls has little book "the plain truth about going back to the land." Towards the end of the volume, to be sure, are some honest and sensible suggestions for those who have tired of the minor victories of urban life and make the blue patch of sky through the office window on the first spring days the central background of a tempting picture of rolling hills and bright fields their own. Mr. Tilden is sympathetic towards this middle-aged city hunger for the soil, although he is merciless in knocking the romanticism from that vision. He asks as a final test, "Are you willing to pull stones?" He does explain how to differentiate between mere restlessness or impatience or languid sense of defeat and a genuine love for farm work. He reveals how such love expresses itself: in a passion for perfection in little things, in justice to animals as well as understanding of them and affection for them, in an eagerness to be punctual in routine, in an undaunted pleasure to learn through mistakes. He does not stress the compensatory satisfactions. But his book is much more than "the plain truth about going back to the land." It is the record of one heroic soul, by name Alexander Hadlock, who in 1906 at the age of sixty-two with no money and no previous experience in farm work, went back to the soil. He had his black years; four winters of "working out" on others' farms; five years before he had his own few acres and his "shack." He gradually and doggedly saved and learned and succeeded. It is an epic of determination and will-power. Mr. Tilden calls it "second wind." To anyone over forty, discouraged and visionless about the future, this unpretentious record of actual achievement must come as a challenging inspiration. Yet to any reader it is breathlessly interesting. Mr. Tilden makes the clash between the "good" and the "bad" farmer the most romantic clash of the struggle for existence. Here, in homely symbols of the soil, is the final distinction between victory and defeat.

Contributors

WILLIAM HARD has contributed many articles on politics and economics to various periodicals and is now investigating problems of organization in Washington for The New Republic. He is the author of The Women of Tomorrow.

EDWARD S. CORWIN is professor of politics at Princeton University and is the author of The History of Scandinavia, The Doctrine of Judicial Review, French Policy and American Alliance, and other books.

KENNETH MACGOWAN is a dramatic critic, who has lately been writing about the movies. He was formerly assistant dramatic editor on the Boston Evening Transcript.

L. PEARSALL SMITH is an American who has lived mainly in England and is the author of The Youth on Parnassus and other books.



What about fall business?

General business this fall is going to be a big factor in all lines of industry and also the investment market.

Avoid worry. Cease depending on rumors or luck. Recognize that all action is followed by equal reaction. Work with a definite policy based on fundamental statistics.

Address Dept. N-2 of

Babson's Statistical Organization

Compiling Bldg. Wellesley Hills, Mass.

Largest Organization of its Character in the World

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED